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About The Lewin Group 
The Lewin Group is a health care and human services policy research and management 
consulting firm. We have over 25 years of experience in estimating the impact of major health 
reform proposals. The Lewin Group is committed to providing independent, objective and non-
partisan analyses of policy options. In keeping with our tradition of objectivity, The Lewin 
Group is not an advocate for or against any legislation. The Lewin Group is part of Ingenix, Inc., 
which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the UnitedHealth Group. To assure the independence of 
its work, The Lewin Group has editorial control over all of its work products. 
Go to www.lewin.com/integrity for more information. 
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Executive Summary 
In this study we estimate the impact of The America’s Healthy Future Act as adopted by the 
Senate Finance Committee. The Act would require most Americans to have health insurance. To 
assure access to affordable coverage, the Bill expands the Medicaid program to 133 percent of 
the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) for all adults. It also provides a new premium tax credit for 
people living between 133 percent and 400 percent of the FPL (e.g., $88,000 for a family of four).  
In addition, the Act establishes an “exchange” that presents consumers with a selection of 
health coverage alternatives that is available to individuals and firms with fewer than 100 
workers. States would have the option to extend eligibility to larger employers beginning in 
2017.  Only people participating in the exchange who do not have access to employer coverage 
would be eligible for the premium tax credit.  The Act also reforms insurance markets by 
assuring guaranteed issue of coverage and prohibiting plans from varying premiums with 
health status. 
Employers with more than 50 workers are required to pay a penalty for each uninsured worker 
receiving a premium tax credit through the exchange. The Act also provides an employer health 
insurance tax credit for up to two years for firms with fewer than 25 workers with an average 
employee earnings of less than $40,000. Workers offered coverage by an employer are not 
eligible for premium subsides offered in the exchange unless the cost of employer coverage 
exceeds 10 percent of income.     
The Act is funded with reductions in spending under Medicare and Medicaid, a new excise tax 
on high cost health plans (premiums over $8,000 for individuals and $21,000 for families). It also 
includes a second excise tax on insurance, new excise taxes on branded prescription drugs and 
device manufacturers, and other changes in revenues.  
In this study we provide estimates of the program’s impact on coverage and spending for the 
federal government, state and local governments, private employers and consumers. To 
demonstrate the long-term impact of the Act, we provide estimates for a 20-year period from 
2010 through 2029. 
Coverage 
To illustrate the Act’s impacts, we estimated the changes in coverage assuming the program is 
fully implemented and enrollment is fully matured in 2011. Changes in coverage include: 
 The number of people without health insurance would be reduced by 23.9 million 
people, which is less than half the 49.2 million people who will be uninsured in that 
year (Figure ES-1);   
 Of the 25.3 million people who remain uninsured, about 15.4 million are exempt from 
the penalty, including 3.7 million children, 4.7 million adults below 133 percent of the 
FPL, 2.0 million adults insured for 3 months or less, and 5.0 million adults who face a 
premium in excess of 8 percent of income.; 
 The Act increases eligibility for Medicaid to 133 percent of the FPL for all adults, 
resulting in a net increase in Medicaid enrollment of 14.1 million people;   
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 The number of people with employer-sponsored insurance will decline by 7.3 million 
people. This includes:   
 About 19.1 million people in firms that drop their coverage once their workers 
become eligible for subsidized coverage in the exchange; and  
 About 11.8 million people in firms that decide to offer coverage to avoid the 
penalty.   
 The number of people with coverage as an individual would increase from 14.3 million 
people under current law to 31.4 million people under the Act.  
Figure ES-1 
Changes in Sources of Coverage under the America’s Healthy Future Act Assuming Full 
Implementation in 2011 (millions) a/ 
 
a/ For illustrative purposes, we assume that the program is fully implemented and enrollment  is fully 
mature in 2011. Estimates assume that the exchange is open to individuals and firms with fewer than 
50 workers only. 
Source: The Lewin Group using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
Federal Costs 
Our analysis shows that the Act is fully funded with the revenues and program savings 
included in the legislation over both the 2010 through 2019 and 2020 through 2029 period. The 
Act would reduce the deficit by $15.9 billion in the first decade and $355.4 billion over the 
second decade (Figure ES-2). Key findings include: 
 Total benefits costs under the Act would be $875.3 billion the 2010 through 2019 period 
including the cost of the Medicaid expansion ($329.4 billion), the premium tax credits 
($505.7 billion) and the small employer tax credit ($27.2 billion);  
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 There would be program offsets of $291 billion over this period including penalty 
payments and an excise tax on high-cost health plans;  
 Reduced payments under Medicare and Medicaid would save $404.2 billion over the 
ten-year period; and 
 There would be other revenues of $196 billion including new excise taxes on branded 
prescription drugs ($22.2 billion), medical device manufacturers ($38.6 billion) and a 
second excise tax on insurers ($60.4 billion).  
Figure ES-2 
Changes in Federal Expenditures and Revenues under the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009: 
2010-2019 (billions)  
 Spending for 2010 - 2019 
Spending for 
2020 - 2029 
Spending for 
2010 - 2029 
New Program Costs 
New Program Costs    
Medicaid Eligibility Expansion $329.4 $1,124.4 $1,453.7 
Premium Subsidies $505.7 $1,490.7 $1,996.5 
Employer Tax Credit $27.2 $36.3 $63.5 
Retiree Reinsurance Program $5.0 $0.0 $5.0 
High Risk Pool/Co-op Funding  $8.0 $0.0 $8.0 
Total Program Costs $875.3 $2,651.4 $3,526.7 
Program Offsets    
Employer Penalty Payments $64.8 $149.2 $214.0 
Penalties for Uninsured $17.6 $47.6 $65.1 
Changes in Other Federal Programs -$18.9 -$77.9 -$96.9 
Taxes on Changes in Wages -$12.9 -$135.9 -$148.9 
Tax on High Cost Insurance $240.5 $1,336.6 $1,577.1 
Total Offsets $291.0 $1,319.4 $1,610.4 
Net Federal Cost of Programs 
Net Federal Cost $584.3 $1,332.0 $1,916.3 
Financing 
Medicare and Medicaid Payment Reforms a/ -$404.2 -$1,386.1 -$1,790.3 
Other Revenue Measures b/  $196.0 $301.3 $497.3 
Net Federal Cost 
Net Federal Cost of Reform -$15.9 -$355.4 -$371.3 
a/ Based on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates for 2010 through 2019.  
b/ Based on Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates for 2010 through 2019.  
Source: The Lewin Group Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
The Act imposes an excise of 40 percent of the cost of insurance in excess of $8,000 for 
individuals and $21,000 for families. Revenues from the tax would grow faster than the growth 
in benefits costs because the thresholds would be indexed over time at only about half the rate 
of growth in health care spending (i.e., CPI plus one percent). 
 The tax would raise $240.5 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period; 
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 The tax would affect coverage for 33.3 million people when first implemented in 2013, 
of whom 3.1 million would be retirees; 
 The number of people in affected plans would grow to 60.5 million people in 2019 and 
110.7 million people by 2029; and 
 Revenues over the 2020 through 2029 period would be $1.3 trillion.   
State and Local Governments    
We estimate that the Act would result in a net savings to state and local governments of about 
$63.7 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period, primarily due to savings in safety-net programs 
that now serve the uninsured.  States would save about $121.9 billion over the 2020 through 
2029 period.    
 States would be required to pay roughly 10 percent of the cost of the Medicaid 
expansion beginning in 2014, which would be $14.4 billion over the 2010 through 2019 
period;  
 Health benefit costs for state and local government workers would increase by about 
$45.4 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period reflecting the cost of the excise taxes and 
costs of either covering uninsured workers, or paying the employer penalty described 
above; and  
 State and local governments would save $122.2 billion on spending for safety-net 
programs resulting from the reduction in the number of uninsured.  
Private Employers   
The Act requires employers with 50 or more workers to either provide coverage or pay a 
penalty for each uninsured worker receiving the premium tax credit equal to the national 
average credit amount. An employer’s liability is capped at $400 times the number of fulltime 
workers. Also, the Act provides a tax credit to lower-wage firms with fewer than 25 workers for 
the purchase of coverage.  
 In the early years of the program, firms that currently offer insurance would see a 
reduction in annual health spending of $268 per worker. This would be primarily for 
firms that discontinue their health plans once subsidized coverage becomes available 
to their workers under the Act (Figure ES-3); 
 Costs for firms that do not now offer coverage would increase by an average of about 
$301 per worker;  
 Small insuring firms would save up to an average of $950 per worker due to the small 
employer tax credit;  
 After 2016, employer spending would increase steadily under the Act reflecting the 
cost of paying the various excise taxes under the Act. Total employer health spending 
would increase by 2.1 percent by 2019; and 
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 These estimates reflect increases in cost-shifting under the Act and assume that the cost 
of the excise tax payments will be passed on to employers and consumers in 
premiums, adjusted for a consumer price response.   
Figure ES-3 
Average Annual Change in Employer Costs per Worker by  
Current Insuring Status and Firm Size: 2011  
 
a/ For illustrative purposes, these estimates assume that the Act is fully implemented and enrollment 
is fully matured in 2011.  
Source: Lewin Group Estimates Using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
Impacts on Families 
Under current law, families will spend an average of about $4,192 per family for health care in 
2011. This includes average family premium payments of $2,648, including employee 
contributions to employer coverage. It also includes average out-of-pocket expenses for 
insurance co-payments and uncovered health services of $1,544. 
 Average health spending would increase by about $218 per family under, primarily 
due to increased premium payments for newly insured people; 
 Insured families with income below $50,000 would on average see savings averaging 
up to $500 per family (Figure ES-4); and 
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 Families with one or more uninsured members would on average see an increase in 
family health spending of $1,205 per family. 
Figure ES-4 
Changes in Average Annual Family Health Spending by Family Income and Current Insured Status 
under the America’s Healthy Future Act, Assuming Implementation in 2011a/ 
 
a/ For illustrative purposes, this scenario Assumes that the Act is fully implemented and enrollment is 
fully matured in 2011. 
Source:  The Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
Impact on National Health Spending 
National health spending will reach $2.77 trillion in 2011, including payments for all health care 
providers by all public and private payers and households. Under the Act:  
 Total national health spending would increase by about $35 billion in the earliest years 
of the program, which is an increase of only about one tenth of one percent;  
 The increase in national health spending would be $114.2 billion over the 2010 through 
2019 period and $527.4 billion over the 2020 through 2029 period; and  
 Most of the increase in spending would be attributed to increased utilization of health 
services by newly insured people.  
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Cost Shifting  
The proposal would reduce spending under public programs by about $404.2 billion over the 
2010 through 2019 period, of which about two thirds ($241.9 billion) would be in the form of 
reduced payments to providers for health services. These reductions in provider reimbursement 
would be partly offset by reductions in uncompensated care of $151.4 billion over this period. 
Historically, about 40 percent of these reductions in revenues have been passed back to private 
payers in the form of higher charges. We estimate that: 
 The Act would increase the total amount of the cost-shift by about $8.6 billion in 2014, 
rising to $25.8 billion in 2019; 
 Total cost shifting over the 2010 through 2019 period would be $34.4 billion;  
 The cost shift would rise to $190.9 billion over the 2020 through 2029 period; and 
 The cost shift would affect premiums for all employers including government workers 
health benefits, and premium payments by individuals. 
  9 
 
495261 
A. The America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009  
We were asked to estimate the cost and coverage impacts of the America’s Healthy Future Act 
of 2009, as adopted by the Senate Finance Committee. The Act would require most Americans 
to have health insurance. To assure access to affordable coverage, the Bill expands the Medicaid 
program to cover all adults with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) 
($29,300 for a family of four), and provides a premium tax credit for people living between 133 
percent and 400 percent of the FPL (i.e., $88,000 for a family of four). It also requires employers 
to pay a penalty based upon the number of their fulltime workers who receive the premium tax 
credit. 
In addition, the Act establishes an “exchange” that presents a selection of health coverage 
alternatives. Insurance markets are reformed to assure guaranteed issue of coverage to all 
applicants regardless of health status. Furthermore, insurers would be prohibited from charging 
higher premiums on the basis of health status. The key provisions of the Bill are summarized 
below. 
1. Reforming the Insurance Markets 
The Act would establish a nationwide network of state-based health insurance exchanges. The 
exchange would provide consumers with a selection of health insurance plans competing on the 
basis of price and quality. It is designed to provide consumers with a transparent marketplace 
for coverage that features consumer protections and facilitates enrollment. The exchange would 
be available to individuals and firms with fewer than 100 workers. States would have the option 
to extend eligibility to larger employers beginning in 2017. 
Premium Rating Practices: The Act eliminates the practice of “medical underwriting.” This 
requires insurers to guarantee issue coverage to all applicants without pre-existing health 
conditions, and prohibits insurers from charging more for people with a history of illness. The 
Act also eliminates lifetime and annual limits on benefits. These insurance reforms apply to all 
coverage sold inside and outside of the exchange.  
Premiums in the individual market are permitted to vary by geographic area, and family type 
(i.e., single, family with child etc.). Premiums may vary with age within a rating band of 4:1. 
Insurers may also vary premiums with tobacco use by a factor of 1.5:1. These same rules would 
be phased-in for the small group market over a period of 5 years. In addition, the Act provides 
funding for high-risk pools for individuals who have been denied coverage, which would be 
available until 2013 when the insurance market reforms are to be fully implemented. 
The Act requires all plans in the individual and small group markets (defined to include firms 
with 1 to 50 workers) participate in a risk adjustment system designed to correct for any 
systematic accumulation of high-cost cases in individual health plans. Also, to stabilize the 
market in the early years of the program, all insurers participating in the individual market are 
required to participate in a reinsurance program funded with assessments on all insurers 
during 2013, 2014 and 2015.      
Benefits Packages: The Act establishes actuarial standards for all policies sold on the 
individuals and small group markets. These plans must have no cost-sharing requirements for 
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preventive care services (except in cases where value-based benefits design is used). The 
Secretary would be required to review and update these lists of covered services on a regular 
basis. The minimum services that must be covered include:  
 Preventive and primary care; 
 Emergency services; 
 Inpatient hospital services;  
 Outpatient hospital services; 
 Day surgery and anesthesia; 
 Physician services; 
 Diagnostic imaging and screening; 
 Pediatric services including dental and vision care; 
 Maternity services and newborn care; 
 Prescription drugs including the class and category of drug coverage requirements 
specified under Medicare Part D; 
 Medical/surgical care;  
 Radiation and chemotherapy; and 
 Mental Health and Substance abuse treatment.   
The Act specifies four different levels of benefit packages, all of which cover these same 
services. The Act denominates these four benefits packages in terms of their “actuarial value.” A 
benefits package that covers all of the services listed above without cost-sharing (deductibles, 
copayments, etc.) is defined to have an actuarial value of 1.0. The actuarial value falls as cost 
sharing amounts increase under these benefits options. These four benefits packages include: 
 Bronze Package:  Includes the core set of covered benefits and a level of cost sharing 
giving the plan an actuarial value of 65;  
 Silver Package:  Includes the core set of covered benefits with more generous cost 
sharing giving the package an actuarial value of 70; 
 Gold Package:  Includes the core set of covered benefits with cost sharing that puts the 
package at an actuarial value of 80; and 
 Platinum Package:  Includes the core set of covered benefits with cost-sharing putting 
the package at an actuarial value of 90. 
All four of these benefit levels would have an out-of pocket limit equal to the minimum under 
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) (i.e., $5,950 for individuals and $11,900 for families), which is 
reduced for people below 400 percent of the FPL. There would be no lifetime limit on covered 
services under any of these benefits packages. A separate “young invincible” policy would be 
available for those aged 25 or younger that provides catastrophic protection using the HSA out-
of-pocket spending limit. Also, small employers purchasing coverage through the exchange 
  11 
 
495261 
must purchase a policy with a deductible that does not exceed $2,000 for individuals and $4,000 
for families.     
However, the actual cost-sharing requirements used under each benefits package are not 
specified in the Act, and are permitted to differ across health insurers. To illustrate their likely 
coverage characteristics, we estimated example combinations of deductibles and co-payment 
amounts for covered services that would correspond to each of four actuarial value standards. 
These illustrative cost-sharing amounts are presented in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 
Illustrative Cost-Sharing Amounts Consistent with Actuarial Valuation of Health Plan Options a/ 
Senate Finance Committee Benefits Packages 
 Without 
Cost 
Sharing 
Platinum 
Package 
Gold 
Package 
Silver 
Package 
Bronze 
Package 
Actuarial Value 100% 90% 80% 70% 65% 
Hospital Deductible $0  $100  $400  $1,500  $2,500  
Hospital Coinsurance 0% 10% 15% 25% 30% 
  Medical Deductible 
Single $0  $100  $400  $1,500  $2,500  
Family $0  $200  $800  $3,000  $5,000  
Medical Coinsurance 0% 10% 25% 30% 35% 
Prescription Drugs 0% 10% 25% 30% 35% 
Preventive Care 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Out-of-Pocket Limit 
Single $0  $5,950  $5,950  $5,950  $5,950  
Family $0  $11,900  $11,900  $11,900  $11,900  
Per Member Per Month 
(PMPM) in 2011 $424  $382  $339  $297  $276  
a/ Estimates developed using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data for people currently 
covered under employer plans. We assumed that the intent of the Bill is to set these benefits on the 
basis of differences in cost-sharing only and does not include the utilization response at various levels 
of cost sharing. Cost sharing parameters under these benefits packages would be somewhat lower if the 
utilization response is incorporated into the estimates.  
Source:  Lewin Group Estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM) 
2. Individual Responsibility 
The program requires most individuals to have health insurance. Individuals must show proof 
of coverage when they file income taxes. People who do not have coverage are required to pay 
an excise tax penalty of $750 per uninsured adult. The penalty would be phased-in between 
2014 and 2017. The penalty does not apply to children. It also does not apply to adults with 
incomes below 133 percent of the FPL or adults who have were uninsured for 3 months or less. 
Also, people are exempt from the coverage requirement if the cost of the lowest cost option 
available to them exceeds 8 percent of income. Available coverage includes individual coverage 
and employer coverage if offered.  
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To promote the affordability of coverage, the Act expands eligibility for Medicaid and provides 
a new tax credit for individuals purchasing insurance in the newly created exchanges. 
Medicaid eligibility: Eligibility for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) often varies substantially across states. Under current law, children are typically eligible 
for either Medicaid or the CHIP programs if their family income is less than 200 percent of the 
FPL, although many states have higher income eligibility levels for children. Pregnant women 
are typically eligible through 150 percent of the FPL.  
Although eligibility varies by state, custodial parents are typically eligible for Medicaid if their 
income is below an average of about 50 percent of the FPL. Also, in most states, non-disabled 
adults without custodial responsibilities for children (i.e., non-custodial adults) are not eligible 
at any level of income (Figure 2). Under the Act, all individuals and families are eligible if their 
income is below 133 percent of the FPL beginning in 2014.  
The Act requires states to maintain existing income eligibility levels until the exchanges are 
established in 2013. Beginning in 2014, income disregards would no longer apply in 
determining eligibility.1 Eligibility would be based upon modified gross income. People losing 
coverage as a result are expected to be eligible for the new premium assistance program 
described below unless they are offered coverage by an employer. The CHIP program would be 
retained in its current form.   
Figure 2 
Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility for a “Typical State” Under Current Law a/ 
a/ Figures are roughly based upon average income eligibility levels across states by eligibility 
group. 
Source: Program data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
                                                     
1  Under current law, states have had the option to use income disregards as a means of increasing 
income eligibility levels for the program.   
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The federal government currently matches state spending for the Medicaid program according 
to a Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). Federal matching rates vary across states 
based upon differences in state income levels and economic characteristics. Although the 
federal contribution amount varies by state, the federal government currently pays for about 57 
percent of the Medicaid program and about 71 percent of the CHIP program.  
Under the Act, the existing FMAP would remain at their current levels for currently eligible 
groups. The Act specifies a new formula for setting the matching rate for newly eligible 
populations that initially provides greater assistance to state that have not already covered at 
least some of the newly eligible groups. However, these matching rates would be adjusted each 
year so that by 2019, the matching rate for the newly eligible groups is the same for all states.  
Under this formula, roughly 90 percent of costs for the newly eligible groups would be paid by 
the federal government. Using this formula, we estimated the weighted average federal 
matching rate for the newly eligible based upon a Lewin Group analysis of the number of 
people newly eligible for the program by state for the following years: 
2014: 91.7% 
2015: 91.5% 
2016: 91.1% 
2017: 90.8% 
2018: 90.5% 
2019: 89.7%  
         
Premium Subsidies: The Act also provides a refundable premium tax credit for the purchase of 
coverage through the state exchanges. The credits would be based on cost of the premium as a 
percentage of income. The credit would limit family premium payments as a percentage of 
income, ranging from 2 percent of income for people at 100 percent of the FPL to 12 percent of 
income for those at 300 percent of the FPL. A cap of 12 percent of income would apply for 
people with incomes between 300 percent and 400 percent of the FPL.  
In most cases, these subsidies are available only to people participating in the exchange as 
individuals who do not have access to employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). However, as 
explained below, workers who are offered employer coverage may be eligible for the credit if 
the employer plan has an actuarial value of less than 65, or the employee share of the premium 
is greater than 10 percent of the worker’s income. 
Cost-sharing Subsidies: The program also limits family out-of-pocket spending by “buying 
up” the premium for eligible individuals to cover a greater share of cost-sharing. The subsidy 
would bring the actuarial value of coverage to 90 percent for people between 100 percent and 
150 percent of the FPL, and 80 percent for people living between 150 percent and 200 percent of 
the FPL. These subsidies are available only to those participating in the exchange as individuals. 
People covered under the exchange by an employer do not qualify for subsidies. 
3. Employer Responsibility 
Employers are not required to cover their workers. However, the Act does provide a tax credit 
to small employers for up to half of their cost of health insurance. Also, employers with 50 or 
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more employees who do not offer coverage are required to pay a flat dollar penalty for each 
employee receiving a tax credit in the state exchange.  
Employer Penalty Fee: The flat dollar fee would be equal to the national average tax credit 
under the program. The fee is capped for all employers at an amount equal to $400 multiplied 
by the number of fulltime employees in the firm, regardless of the number receiving a credit. 
Thus, the employer would pay the lesser of the flat dollar amount multiplied by the number of 
fulltime workers receiving a tax credit, or a fee of $400 for each fulltime worker. These 
payments would be paid to the general fund.  
As discussed above, workers offered coverage by the employer are generally ineligible for the 
tax credit. However, an employee who is offered coverage that does not have an actuarial value 
of at least 65 percent, or who is offered coverage that is “unaffordable” may receive the tax 
credit. Coverage is defined to be unaffordable if the premium exceeds 10 percent of employee 
income.  
Small Employer Tax Credit: The Act also provides employers with fewer than 25 fulltime 
equivalent (FTE) workers a tax credit for the purchase of insurance for their workers. The tax 
credit for eligible firms is potentially equal to 35 percent of employer contributions for qualified 
coverage in 2011 and 2012. Beginning in 2013, the credit is potentially equal to 50 percent of 
employer contributions. The amount of the credit is phased-out for firms with average annual 
earnings per worker between $20,000 and $40,000. The amount of the credit is also phased-out 
for employers with between 10 and 25 employees.  
Beginning in 2013, the credit is available only to firms purchasing coverage through the state 
exchange. The credit would be available for the first two years a qualified firm purchases 
coverage. The credit is not advanceable and is not refundable (i.e., the credit may not exceed the 
amount an employer’s tax liability). The tax credit amount for tax exempt organizations is 
limited to 25 percent in 2011 and 2012, and 35 percent in 2013 and thereafter.    
In addition, the Act provides $5.0 billion in funding for a reinsurance program that would assist 
employers sponsoring retiree benefits plans. The program would cover expenses in eligible 
firms for individual retirees with high expenditures. The program would cover 80 percent of 
costs between $15,000 and $90,000. This assistance would be available in 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
4. Other Financing Measures   
The Act would be funded with savings to the Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as 
several new revenue raising measures.  
Reduction in Medicare and Medicaid Spending: The Act includes an extensive list of changes 
that alter Medicare provider payment policies for virtually all types of providers of health 
services including physicians, hospitals, home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, 
rehabilitation hospitals and other health care practitioners. CBO estimates that these changes 
would result in net savings of $404.2 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period (Figure 3).
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Figure 3 
CBO Estimates of the Effects of Medicare and Medicaid Provisions under the Act on Provider Revenues: 2010-2019 
(billions) 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
2010-
2019 
Medicaid Program -$0.4 -$1.0 -$1.4 -$1.4 -$2.7 -$3.4 -$4.5 -$3.9 -$3.7 -$5.3 -$27.7 
DSH Payments $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 -$2.2 -$2.9 -$4.1 -$4.2 -$4.3 -$4.5 -$22.2 
Other Medicaid -$0.4 -$1.0 -$1.4 -$1.4 -$0.5 -$0.5 -$0.4 $0.3 $0.6 -$0.8 -$5.5 
Medicare Advantage Payments $0.0 -$6.2 -$6.6 -$10.3 -$11.0 -$12.2 -$13.9 -$16.7 -$18.9 -$21.5 -$117.3 
Medicare Provider Payments  -$0.4 -$1.7 -$4.7 -$9.2 -$14.1 -$19.8 -$26.1 -$32.6 -$39.3 -$47.4 -$195.3 
Hospitals paid under the 
inpatient PPS 
-$0.3 -$0.8 -$2.9 -$5.5 -$8.1 -$10.9 -$13.8 -$17.2 -$21.1 -$25.9 -$106.5 
Skilled Nursing facilities $0.0 $0.0 -$0.3 -$0.7 -$1.1 -$1.5 -$1.9 -$2.4 -$3.0 -$3.7 -$14.6 
Hospice $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 -$0.3 -$0.5 -$0.8 -$1.0 -$1.4 -$1.7 -$2.1 -$7.8 
Home health -$0.1 -$0.5 -$0.7 -$1.4 -$2.5 -$4.1 -$6.3 -$7.9 -$9.1 -$10.6 -$43.2 
Part B fee schedules, except 
physicians' services 
$0.0 -$0.4 -$0.8 -$1.3 -$1.9 -$2.5 -$3.1 -$3.7 -$4.4 -$5.1 -$23.2 
Medicare DSH $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 -$4.0 -$4.3 -$4.7 -$4.6 -$4.9 -$22.5 
Medicare Commission $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 -$1.5 -$3.1 -$4.3 -$6.2 -$7.1 -$22.2 
Other Changes $9.8 $8.3 $1.8 -$0.1 -$13.9 -$5.8 -$2.8 -$3.8 -$5.4 -$7.3 -$19.2 
Total Change in Spending $9.0 -$0.6 -$10.9 -$21.0 -$41.7 -$46.7 -$54.7 -$66.0 -$78.1 -$93.5 -$404.2 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Letter to the Honorable Max Baucus, Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, from Douglas W. 
Elmendorf, Director, The Congressional Budget Office, October 7, 2009
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About half of the proposed savings ($195.3 billion) would be attributed to changes in provider 
payments for services. The Act also revises the competitive bidding process for Medicare 
Advantage that would result in savings of about $117.3 billion. The Act does not change the 
“sustainable growth rate” (SGR) formula for Medicare payments to physicians and other health 
practitioners. 
The Act reduces Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments under the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs to reflect the expansions in coverage under the bill. Medicare DSH 
payments would be reduced by $22.5 billion over the 2015 through 2019 period, while Medicaid 
DSH payments would be reduced by $22.2 billion between 2014 and 2019.  
In addition, the Act also includes several provisions designed to encourage improved quality 
and efficiency through bundled payments and quality driven payments such as pay-for-
performance. The Act also creates a new “Medicare Commission” charged with developing 
proposals that would reduce costs in the Medicare program. 
Excise Taxes: The Act creates new excise taxes on insurance, prescription drugs and durable 
medical equipment. The largest of these would be an excise tax on high-cost insurance plans. 
Under this provision, insurers pay a tax equal to 40 percent of the amount by which annual 
health benefits costs for an employer health plan exceeds $8,000 for individuals and $21,000 for 
families beginning in 2013. Insurers pay the excise tax based upon data provider by the 
employer. In self-funded plans, the excise tax is paid by the plan administrator or the employer 
in self-administered plans. The threshold is increased by $1,850 for individuals and $5,000 for 
families for workers in high risk occupations and retirees age 55 through 64. 
These thresholds are indexed each year by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) plus one percentage 
point. Because health care costs are expected to grow at nearly double that rate, the number of 
health plans affected and the amounts subject to the tax would increase over time. We estimate 
that this will raise revenues of about $240.5 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period. 
The Act also includes additional excise taxes that the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
estimates will result in an additional $121.2 billion in revenues over ten years. These include: 
 An excise tax on fully insured health plans ($60.4 billion); 
 A fee on manufacturers and importers of branded drugs ($22.2 billion); and 
 A fee on manufacturers and importers of certain medical devices ($38.6 billion).    
We assume that these costs would be passed back to consumers in the form of higher prices. For 
example, the fees on drugs and medical devices would be passed back to insurers and 
individuals as higher prices. Similarly, the excise taxes on insurance would be passed back to 
employers and individuals in the form of higher prices. 
We assume that this rise in prices would be associated with a reduction in consumer demand 
which translates to a real reduction in health spending. However, consumer demand for health 
services has been measured to be largely insensitive to price increases. Based upon available 
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research, we estimate that health spending for affected populations would fall by an amount 
equal to 20 percent of the dollar amount of these excise tax revenues.2   
Other Revenue Raising Measurers: The Act includes an additional $58.5 billion in revenues 
over the 2010 through 2019 period associated with other changes in the tax code and revenues. 
These include: 
 Increase the penalty for nonqualified health savings account (HSA) distributions to 20 
percent ($1.3 billion); 
 Conform the medical expense definition for flexible spending arrangements to the 
medical expense deduction ($5.4 billion); 
 Limit health flexible spending arrangements in flexible spending arrangements to 
$2,500 ($14.6 billion); 
 Eliminate deduction for expenses allocable to Medicare Part D subsidy ($5.4 billion);  
 Raise the 7.5 percent AGI floor on the medical expense deduction to 10 percent for 
people under age 65 ($15.2 billion); and 
 Other tax provisions ($16.6 billion). 
CBO and JCT estimate an addition $16.3 billion in revenues over the 2010 through 2019 under 
various provisions of the Act including fraud waste and abuse provisions, premium taxes for 
outcomes research and revenues due to other changes in premiums.  
B. Coverage Effects 
We project that there will be about 49.1 million uninsured people in 2011. We estimate that if 
the Act were fully implemented in 2011, the number of uninsured would be reduced by 23.9 
million people, leaving about 25.3 million people without insurance (Figure 4). Thus, we 
estimate that the program would cover a little less than half of the uninsured.  
Enrollment in the expanded Medicaid program would increase by 14.1 million people. This 
includes about 16.1 million newly enrolled people, less about 2.0 million current enrollees who 
would become covered in the exchange or by an employer. For example, some employers 
would decide to offer insurance in response to the employer assessment for employees taking 
coverage through the exchange. 
 
 
                                                     
2  W.G. Manning, et al., “Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized 
Experiment,” The American Economic Review, vol.77, No. 3, June 1987, pp.251-277. 
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Figure 4 
Changes in Sources of Coverage under the America’s Healthy Future Act Assuming Full 
Implementation in 2011 (millions) a/ 
a/ For illustrative purposes, we assume that the program is fully implemented and enrollment  is fully 
mature in 2011. Estimates assume that the exchange is open to individuals and firms with fewer than 50 
workers only. 
Source: The Lewin Group using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
We estimate that the number of people purchasing coverage as individuals in the individual 
market would increase from 14.3 million people under current law to about 31.4 million people 
once the act is fully implemented. Of these about 24.9 million (70 percent) people would obtain 
their coverage through the exchange. This reflects that the premiums subsidy tax credit is 
available only to individuals purchasing coverage through the exchange. 
We estimate that the number of people with private employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) would 
decline by about 7.3 million people under the Act. These include 19.1 million workers and 
dependents that would lose their employer coverage, primarily in cases where the employer 
decides to discontinue their employer health plan once the expanded Medicaid and premium 
subsidy programs become available. However, this loss of employer coverage is partly offset by 
increased employer coverage of 11.8 million people in cases where the employer decides to start 
offering coverage to avoid the new employer penalty payments.  
The discontinuations of employer coverage are known as “crowd-out.” Because subsidies are 
available only for people purchasing individual coverage through the exchange, some insuring 
firms would find that workers can obtain individual coverage with the subsidies for less than it 
would cost to continue with their employer plan. Some employees may also become covered 
under the expanded Medicaid program. This would affect many employers since subsidies are 
available through 400 percent of the FPL, which is about $88,000 for a family of four. These firms 
are the ones most likely to discontinue coverage.   
Figure 5 presents a detailed summary of the changes in sources of coverage under the Act.
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Figure 5 
Transitions in Coverage under the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009; Assuming Full Implementation in 2011 
(thousands)/a 
 
Coverage Through 
Exchange Private Coverage 
Coverage Under Current Law Employer  Individual  Employer Individual Retiree 
TRICARE Medicare 
Medicare 
& 
Medicaid 
Dual 
Eligible 
Medicaid 
and 
SCHIP 
Uninsured 
Employer Workers 
and Dependents 154,436 5,933 12,257 129,363 0 0 0 0 0 3,923 2,960 
Private Non-Employer 14,335 377 4,112 1,715 6,532 0 0 0 0 763 836 
Employer Retiree 3,711 0 0 0 0 3,711 0 0 0 0 0 
TRICARE 6,142 0 0 0 0 0 6,142 0 0 0 0 
Medicare 33,195 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,195 0 0 0 
Medicare & Medicaid 
Dual Eligible 6,811 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,811 0 0 
Medicaid and SCHIP 41,673 528 524 996 0 0 0 0 0 39,625 0 
Uninsured 49,191 2,161 7,979 6,022 0 0 0 0 0 11,510 21,519 
Total 309,494 8,999 24,872 138,096 6,532 3,711 6,142 33,195 6,811 55,821 25,315 
a/ For illustrative purposes, we assume that the program is fully implemented and enrollment is fully mature in 2011. 
Source: The Lewin Group Estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
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As discussed above, we estimate that about 25.3 million people would remain uninsured under 
the Act. Of these 19.4 million are people who are exempt from the penalty for those who remain 
uninsured (Figure 6). Of these, abut 4.0 million are undocumented immigrants. These also 
include about 4.7 million adults living below 133 percent of the FPL, and 2.0 million adults who 
were uninsured for 3 months or less, both of which groups are specifically exempted from the 
Penalty. Another 3.8 million are children, who are also exempt from the penalty under the Act. 
There also would be about 5.0 million adults that are also exempt from the penalty because the 
coverage available to them would cost more than 8 percent of their income. 
Figure 6 
Number of People Remaining Uninsured under the Act if Fully Implemented in 2011 
(millions) 
 Number Remaining Uninsured 
Undocumented Immigrants  4.0 
Exempt from Penalty  
Children 3.7 
   Adults below 133 Percent of FPL 4.7 
   Uninsured 3 Months or Less 2.0 
 Premiums over 8 Percent of Income 5.0 
       Total Exempt from the Penalty 15.4 
Subject to Penalty  
   Pay Penalty 4.3 
   Do not Pay Penalty 1.6 
       Total Subject to Penalty 5.9 
Total Remaining Uninsured 25.3 
Source:  Lewin Group Estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
About 5.9 million of the uninsured would be adults that face a penalty for not having insurance. 
However, we estimate that only 4.3 million of these people would pay the penalty. About 1.6 
million people would not voluntarily pay the penalty because they do not file a tax return.3 
                                                     
3  There are estimated to be about 12 million undocumented people in the U.S. We assume that of these, 
6.2 million are uninsured. 
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C. Impact on Federal Spending 
In this study, we developed estimates of the impact of the Act on federal spending over a 20 
year period between 2010 through 2029. The Congress uses 10-year forecasts for budgeting 
purposes, which is currently 2010 through 2019. Because the coverage expansions under the Act 
would not take effect until 2013, the program would be in operation for only 7 of the 10 years 
included in the 10-year “budget window.” To better understand the long-term budget 
implications of the Act, we present spending estimates for both the 2010 through 2019 budget 
window and the 2020 through 2029 period.    
New federal spending under the Act would be $875.3 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period 
(Figure 7). This would be offset by $291.0 billion resulting from the coverage provisions of the 
proposal, including individual and employer penalties. It also includes $240.5 billion in 
revenues from the excise tax on high-cost health plans. The financing provisions of the Act 
include $404.2 billion in spending reductions for Medicare and Medicaid, and other new tax 
revenues of about $196.0 billion.  
This results in a net reduction in the federal deficit of $15.9 billion over this 10-year period. We 
also project continuing deficit reductions totaling $371.3 billion over the 2020 through 2029 
period. As discussed below, the primary reason for this is that the thresholds for the excise tax 
on high-cost plans are indexed at about half of the rate of growth in health care costs over-time, 
resulting in a steady increase in the number of plans affected.      
1. New Program Spending 
Key elements of new federal spending under the Act include: 
 Medicaid expansion: Income eligibility levels for parents with custodial 
responsibilities for children would be increased to 133 percent of the FPL in all states. 
Non-custodial adults also would be eligible in all states through 133 percent of the FPL. 
Overall, the federal government would cover about 90 percent of the cost of these 
Medicaid expansions; 
 Premium tax credits: The Act would provide premium and cost-sharing subsidies for 
private insurance sold through the exchange on a sliding scale with income for people 
who do not have access to affordable ESI. Workers offered coverage by an employer 
are not eligible unless the employer coverage would cost the worker more than 10 
percent of his/her income;  
 Small employer tax credit: The Act includes a tax credit for employers with fewer than 
25 fulltime equivalent (FTE) workers for up to half of the employer cost of coverage. As 
discussed above, the tax credit is phased-out for employers with average payroll 
between $20,000 and $40,000. The credit is also phased-out for firms with between 10 
and 25 workers. The credit is available to any given employer for no more than 2 years; 
and 
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Figure 7 
Changes in Federal Expenditures and Revenues the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009: 2010-2029 
(billions) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2010-2019 
Public Program Costs 
   Medicaid Eligibility Expansion -$0.2 -$0.2 -$0.3 -$2.7 $18.1 $49.5 $59.5 $63.9 $68.6 $73.2 $329.4 
   Premium Subsidies $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $25.0 $60.3 $72.1 $77.6 $83.7 $90.1 $97.0 $505.7 
   Employer Tax Credit $0.0 $2.5 $3.3 $5.5 $4.4 $2.0 $2.2 $2.3 $2.4 $2.6 $27.2 
   Retiree Reinsurance Program $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $1.5 $1.7 $1.8 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $5.0 
   High Risk Pool/Co-Op Funding $1.0 $2.0 $2.0 $1.5 $1.5 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $8.0 
       Total Program Costs $0.8 $4.3 $5.0 $30.8 $85.9 $125.4 $139.3 $149.9 $161.1 $172.8 $875.3 
Program Offsets 
   Employer Pay-or-Play Taxes $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $5.1 $8.4 $9.3 $9.7 $10.2 $10.7 $11.3 $64.8 
   Penalties for Uninsured $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.9 $1.9 $3.0 $3.8 $3.9 $4.0 $17.6 
   Federal Worker Health Benefits $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 -$1.1 -$2.6 -$3.2 -$3.6 -$4.0 -$4.5 -$18.9 
   Taxes on Changes in Wages -$0.9 -$0.7 -$0.7 $1.4 $1.7 -$0.7 -$1.7 -$2.6 -$3.7 -$5.0 -$12.9 
   Tax on High cost Insurance $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $12.1 $23.0 $28.6 $33.8 $40.0 $47.3 $55.9 $240.5 
       Total Offsets -$0.9 -$0.7 -$0.7 $18.6 $33.0 $36.5 $41.6 $47.8 $54.2 $61.6 $291.0 
 
Net Federal Cost $1.7 $5.0 $5.7 $12.2 $53.0 $89.0 $97.7 $102.1 $106.9 $111.1 $584.3 
 
Medicare and Medicaid Payment Reforms a/ $9.0 -$0.6 -$10.9 -$21.0 -$41.7 -$46.7 -$54.7 -$66.0 -$78.1 -$93.5 -$404.2 
 
Other Revenue Measures b/ $11.1 $13.4 $14.4 $19.0 $20.1 $20.9 $22.0 $23.8 $25.3 $26.0 $196.0 
 
Net Federal Cost of Reform -$0.4 -$9.0 -$19.6 -$27.8 -$8.8 $21.4 $21.0 $12.3 $3.5 -$8.4 -$15.9 
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Figure 7 (continued) 
Changes in Federal Expenditures and Revenues under the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009: 2019-2029  
(billions) 
 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2020-2029 
2010-
2029 
Public Program Costs 
   Medicaid Eligibility Expansion $78.8 $84.8 $91.4 $98.4 $105.9 $114.1 $122.8 $132.3 $142.4 $153.4 $1,124.4 $1,453.7 
   Premium Subsidies $104.5 $112.5 $121.1 $130.4 $140.5 $151.3 $162.9 $175.4 $188.9 $203.4 $1,490.7 $1,996.5 
   Employer Tax Credit $2.7 $2.9 $3.1 $3.3 $3.5 $3.7 $3.9 $4.1 $4.4 $4.7 $36.3 $63.5 
   Retiree Reinsurance Program $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $5.0 
   High Risk Pool/Co-Op Funding  $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $8.0 
       Total Program Costs $186.0 $200.2 $215.6 $232.1 $249.9 $269.0 $289.6 $311.8 $335.7 $361.4 $2,651.4 $3,526.7 
Program Offsets 
   Employer Pay-or-Play Taxes $11.8 $12.4 $13.0 $13.7 $14.4 $15.1 $15.9 $16.7 $17.6 $18.5 $149.2 $214.0 
   Penalties for Uninsured $4.1 $4.3 $4.4 $4.5 $4.7 $4.8 $5.0 $5.1 $5.3 $5.4 $47.6 $65.1 
   Federal Worker Health Benefits -$4.9 -$5.4 -$5.9 -$6.5 -$7.2 -$7.9 -$8.7 -$9.5 -$10.4 -$11.4 -$77.9 -$96.9 
   Taxes on Changes in Wages -$6.0 -$7.1 -$8.5 -$10.0 -$11.9 -$13.7 -$15.8 -$18.2 -$20.9 -$23.8 -$135.9 -$148.9 
   Tax on High cost Insurance  $64.9 $75.3 $87.5 $101.6 $118.0 $134.5 $153.4 $174.8 $199.3 $227.2 $1,336.6 $1,577.1 
       Total Offsets $70.0 $79.5 $90.6 $103.3 $118.0 $132.8 $149.7 $168.9 $190.8 $215.8 $1,319.4 $1,610.4 
 
Net Federal Cost $116.0 $120.7 $125.0 $128.8 $131.9 $136.2 $139.9 $142.9 $144.9 $145.6 $1,332.0 $1,916.3 
 
Medicare and Medicaid Payment 
Reforms a/ -$100.3 -$108.0 -$116.2 -$124.8 -$133.8 -$143.1 -$152.4 -$161.5 -$169.8 -$176.2 -$1,386.1 -$1,790.3 
 
Other Revenue Measures a/ $26.6 $27.3 $28.0 $28.7 $29.5 $30.4 $31.2 $32.2 $33.1 $34.2 $301.3 $497.3 
 
Net Federal Cost of Reform -$10.9 -$14.6 -$19.1 -$24.8 -$31.5 -$37.3 -$43.7 -$50.8 -$58.0 -$64.8 -$355.4 -$371.3 
a/ These estimates are based upon: Congressional Budget Office, Letter to the Honorable Max Baucus, Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. 
Senate, from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, The Congressional Budget Office, October 7, 2009. 
Source: The Lewin Group using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM).  
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 Reinsurance program:  The Bill allocates $5.0 billion to provide reinsurance for high-
cost early retirees currently covered under employer health plans. Under the 
reinsurance coverage provisions of the act, we estimate that the funds would be 
exhausted by the third year of its availability. 
The Act provides about $875.3 billion in new benefits over the 2010 through 2019 period. These 
include increased Medicaid spending of $329.4 billion and premium and cost sharing subsidies 
of $505.7 billion. The employer tax credit would cost $27.2 billion over the 2010 through 2019 
period. Total benefits costs over the following 10-year period (i.e., 2020 through 2029) would be 
$2.65 trillion. In addition, federal health benefits costs for federal workers would increase by 
about 11.4 million over this period due to the excise tax and the costs of coverage or paying 
penalties for uninsured workers.  
The Medicaid coverage expansions would begin in 2014. We expect the program to reach full 
enrollment by 2017 as newly eligible people learn of their eligibility. Our long term budget 
estimates reflect the timing of these events. However, for illustrative purposes, we present our 
estimates of the effect of these changes assuming the program is fully implemented and 
enrollment is fully mature in 2011 (Figure 8).      
Figure 8 
Changes in Medicaid Enrollment and Costs under the America’s Healthy Future Act, assuming it is 
fully implemented in 2011a/ 
Changes in Medicaid and CHIP 
Spending (billions) 
  
Changes in 
Medicaid 
and CHIP 
Enrollment 
(in 1,000s) 
Total Federal State 
Current Enrollment and Cost 48,484  $452.0 $255.2 $196.8 
Changes in Enrollment and Costs Under the Bill 
Current Enrollees Shifting to Private Coverage -1,524 -$6.2 -$3.6 -$2.6 
Current Enrollees losing coverage due to elimination of 
income disregards -524 -$2.2 -$1.3 -$0.9 
Enrollment Increases for Currently Eligible 
   Children 1,537  $1.5  $0.9  $0.6  
   Adults 904  $2.7  $1.6  $1.1  
   Total currently Eligible 2,441  $4.2  $2.4  $1.8  
Eligibility Expansions 
   Parents 2,561  $7.0  $6.4  $0.6  
   Non-Custodial Adults 11,194  $41.7  $38.2  $3.5  
   Total Newly Eligible 13,755  $48.7  $44.7  $4.0  
Net Change 14,148  $44.5  $42.3  $2.2  
a/ For illustrative purposes, this scenario assumes that the Act is fully implemented and enrollment is 
fully matured in 2011.  
Source: The Lewin Group using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
We estimate that there will be about 48.5 million people enrolled in Medicaid (average 
monthly/point in time enrollment) in 2011 on an average monthly basis (excludes people in 
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nursing homes). About 1.5 million of these enrollees would be workers in firms that decide to 
offer coverage in response to the penalties under the Act. Another 524,000 people would lose 
coverage when the use of income disregards in determining eligibility is terminated. Most of 
these individuals would qualify for the premium tax credit, unless their employer offers 
coverage. 
We estimate that about 2.4 million people who are currently eligible but not enrolled would be 
induced to enroll as a result of outreach under the Act. About 1.5 million of these new enrollees 
would be children eligible under the existing Medicaid or the CHIP programs. Another 13.8 
million people would become covered under the expansions in eligibility for adults 
2. Spending Offsets for New Programs 
Total program offsets over the 2010 through 2019 period would be $291.0 billon, of which $240.5 
billion would be due to the excise tax on high-cost health plans (discussed below). 
These offsets include penalties paid by non-insuring employers for workers receiving the tax 
credit for coverage they purchase through the exchange. As described above, the program 
would require employers who do not provide health insurance to pay a penalty of up to $400 
per fulltime worker they do not cover. Total employer penalty revenues would be $64.8 billion 
over the 2010 through 2019 period.    
We also project $17.6 billion in penalty revenues for people who go without insurance over the 
2010 through 2019 period. The penalty amount would be $750 per uninsured adult, which is 
phased-in between 2014 through 2017. Uninsured people are exempt from the penalty if the 
lowest cost coverage option available to them exceeds 8 percent of income.   
However, the program would result in a loss of income and payroll tax revenues of $12.9 billion 
over the 2010 through 2019 period. This revenue loss is due to slowed wage growth resulting 
from the increase in employer costs under the Act. As discussed below, we estimate that the 
employer health spending would initially decline under the Act, but would increase after 2015, 
largely due to the excise taxes under the bill. The available research indicates that employers 
would pass on these higher costs to workers in the form of reduced wage growth, resulting in 
an associated loss of federal income and payroll tax revenues.   
Total offset over the 2020 through 2029 period would be $1.32 trillion. Total benefits costs ($2.65 
trillion) less offsets over that period would be $1.33 trillion.  
3. Excise Tax on High-cost Health Plans  
As discussed above, the Act creates a new excise tax on high-cost insurance plans. Insurers 
would pay a tax equal to 40 percent of the amount by which premiums for an employer health 
plan exceeds $8,000 for individuals and $21,000 for families beginning in 2013. (Higher 
thresholds apply to workers in high-risk occupations and retirees age 55 to 64.) Insures pay the 
excise tax based upon data provider by the employer.  
These thresholds are indexed each year by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) plus one percentage 
point. Because health care costs are expected to grow at nearly twice that rate, more and more 
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health plans will become subject to the tax for increasing amounts over time. As a consequence, 
the amount of revenues raised by the tax will grow by over 15 percent per year. As shown in 
Figure 9, we estimate that in 2013, there will be about 33.3 million people (workers dependents 
and retirees) in firms with benefits costs that exceed the high-cost thresholds, including 3.1 
million retirees. The number of people in affected firms would grow to 60.5 million people by 
2019 and 110.7 million people by 2029.  
Figure 9 
Number of People with Policies subject to the Excise Tax on High-Cost Health Plan Thresholds 
(millions)a/ 
 
a/ The threshold amounts are $8,000 for individuals and $21,000 for families in 2013.   
These amounts are indexed annually to the CPI Plus 1.0 percent.  
Source: The Lewin Group using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
We estimate that the tax would raise revenues of about $240.5 billion over the 2010 through 
2019 period, and $1.34 trillion over the 2020 through 2029 period. In fact, the growth in revenues 
from the tax would exceed the growth in new federal health benefits costs over this period, 
which is the primary reason we show the Act to be better than fully funded through 2029.   
4. Other Financing Measures   
The program is funded with reductions in spending under the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, that the CBO and the JCT estimate would save $404.2 billion over the 2010 through 
2019 period. It would impose a second excise tax on insurers (fully insured only) and creates 
additional excise taxes on manufacturers and importers on branded prescription drugs and 
medical devices. Total revenues from these excise taxes would be $120.8 billion over that 
period. The plan includes an additional $75.2 billion in revenues from other changes in tax 
provisions and revenue effects.    
We estimate that these changes in program spending and revenues would continue through the 
next decade. Savings to Medicare and Medicaid would be $1.39 trillion over the 2020 through 
2029 period. New revenues would total $301.3 billion over that same period.  
We estimated these amounts by extending the 10-year estimates for 2010 through 2019 provided 
by CBO and the JCT through 2029 on a line-item basis. In most instances, we simply assumed 
60.5
89.0
33.3
110.7
2013 2019 2024 2029
Number of High Cost Plans Type of Beneficiary
9.3%
90.7%
Workers and
Dependents
30.2
Retirees
3.1
Number in 2013 = 33.3 million
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that the savings amounts for Medicare and Medicaid would grow in proportion to program 
growth as projected by the Office of the Actuary of the CMS and as reported in the Medicare 
trustees report. The Act sets these excise tax rates at the levels required to collect a fixed dollar 
amount of revenues, which we assume continues through the next decade as well. Other tax 
provisions were projected to increase with health spending as projected by the actuaries of the 
CMS.   
5. Net Federal Costs 
Total federal spending for health will be $39.5 trillion over the twenty-year period between 2010 
and 2029 (Figure 10). This includes all spending for health services and supplies by all payers 
including governments, insurers and consumers. About 56 percent of that spending would be 
for the Medicare program (net of premium offsets). Yet the Medicare trust fund is expected to 
be exhausted by 2017. Thus it is important to consider the long-term effects of the program on 
the federal deficit.  
Figure 10 
Federal Spending for Health under Current Law and Changes in Spending under the America’s 
Healthy Future Act of 2009 
Federal Spending Under Current Law (billions) Change in Net Federal  Spending Under Act 
 
Medicare Medicare Premiums Medicaid 
Other 
Federal 
Federal 
Workers 
Total 
Federal 
Amount 
(billions) 
Percent 
Change 
2010 $516 -$41 $237 $116 $30 $857 -$0.4 0.0% 
2011 $547 -$44 $255 $124 $31 $913 -$9.0 -1.0% 
2012 $585 -$44 $275 $132 $33 $981 -$19.6 -2.0% 
2013 $628 -$49 $297 $142 $34 $1,053 -$27.8 -2.6% 
2014 $674 -$48 $322 $152 $36 $1,137 -$8.8 -0.8% 
2015 $729 -$50 $350 $163 $39 $1,231 $21.4 1.7% 
2016 $789 -$54 $381 $175 $41 $1,332 $21.0 1.6% 
2017 $858 -$58 $414 $187 $43 $1,444 $12.3 0.8% 
2018 $932 -$63 $451 $200 $46 $1,566 $3.5 0.2% 
2019 $1,012 -$65 $491 $214 $49 $1,701 -$8.4 -0.5% 
2020 $1,100 -$72 $534 $229 $52 $1,844 -$10.9 -0.6% 
2021 $1,195 -$78 $581 $246 $55 $1,999 -$14.6 -0.7% 
2022 $1,299 -$86 $633 $263 $59 $2,167 -$19.1 -0.9% 
2023 $1,411 -$94 $689 $281 $62 $2,349 -$24.8 -1.1% 
2024 $1,533 -$103 $750 $301 $66 $2,547 -$31.5 -1.2% 
2025 $1,665 -$113 $817 $322 $70 $2,761 -$37.3 -1.3% 
2026 $1,809 -$123 $889 $345 $74 $2,994 -$43.7 -1.5% 
2027 $1,966 -$135 $968 $369 $79 $3,247 -$50.8 -1.6% 
2028 $2,136 -$147 $1,054 $395 $84 $3,521 -$58.0 -1.6% 
2029 $2,321 -$160 $1,147 $423 $89 $3,819 -$64.8 -1.7% 
2010-2019 $7,271 -$518 $3,473 $1,605 $383 $12,214 -$15.9 -0.1% 
2020-2029 $16,435 -$1,111 $8,063 $3,173 $689 $27,248 -$355.4 -1.3% 
2010-2029 $23,705 -$1,629 $11,536 $4,779 $1,072 $39,463 -$371.3 -0.9% 
Source: Lewin Group estimates using Health Spending Projections developed by the Office of the 
Actuary (OAct) of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  
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We estimate that the Act would reduce the federal deficit by $371.3 billion over that 20 year 
period. Deficit reduction would be $15.9 over the 2010 through 2019 period and $355.4 billion 
over the following decade. These savings represent a net reduction in total national health 
spending (i.e., all payers) of roughly one percent over the 20-year period. 
6. Program Savings and Long-term Budget Effects  
Funding for the proposal is critically dependent upon the proposed savings to Medicare and 
Medicaid included in the Act. As discussed above, the CBO estimates that these provisions 
would save about $404.2 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period. We estimate that these 
savings would increase with projected program growth over the 2020 through 2029 period and 
would reach $1.39 trillion over the 2020 through 2029 period.  
Of the $404.2 billion in savings over the 2010 through 2019 period, about $264.7 billion is 
attributed to reductions in the rate of growth in payments to providers for health services, plus 
reductions in hospital DSH payments. Congress is certain to hear many appeals from providers 
to restore some of these budget cuts in future years. For example, Congress eventually restored 
many of the cuts in provider reimbursement that they adopted under the Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997. Congress also initiated cuts in reimbursement to physicians under the Sustainable 
Growth Rate (SGR) provisions, which are routinely overridden each year by the Congress.  
To illustrate the importance of maintaining these reimbursement reductions on the long-term 
financial stability of the program, we developed estimates of the net impact of the Act on the 
federal deficit under alternative scenarios. As shown in (Figure 11), we estimate that the Act as 
proposed would reduce the federal deficit by about $371.3 billion over the 20-year period 
between 2010 through 2029. If these reductions in reimbursement were to be reduced by 25 
percent, the program would still reduce the deficit over this 20-year period by $96.5 billion, 
although it would run a deficit of $41.3 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period.  
If only half of these payment reductions are sustained, the program would result in a deficit of 
$107.4 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period, and $109.7 billion over the following decade. 
A 75 percent reduction in these provider cuts would result in a deficit of $173.5 billion under the 
Act over the 2010 through 2019 period, and a deficit of $357.2 billion over the following ten 
years.  
Figure 11 
Estimated Impact of the Act on the Federal Deficit under Alternative Provider Payment 
Assumptions 2010 to 2029 
Net Impact of the Act on the Deficit  
2010-2019 2020-2029 2010-2029 
Proposed Medicare and Medicaid Savings under the Act -$15.9 -$355.4 -$371.3 
Alternative Scenarios 
     Provider Payment Cuts reduced by 25 percent $41.3 -$137.8 -$96.5 
     Provider Payment Cuts reduced by 50 percent $107.4 $109.7 $217.1 
     Provider Payment Cuts reduced by 75% $173.5 $357.2 $530.7 
Source:  The Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
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D. Impact on State and Local Governments 
The Act would result in savings to state and local governments of about $63.7 billion over the 
2010 through 2019 period (Figure 12). State and local governments would save $122.2 billion on 
spending for safety-net programs such as public hospitals and clinics. However these savings 
would be partly offset with increases in spending for other state benefits programs, including 
worker health benefits costs.    
The Medicaid expansions under the Act would increase state spending for Medicaid by $14.4 
billion over the 2010 through 2019 period. This includes the state share of the cost of covering 
newly eligible people (roughly 10 percent). It also reflects reductions in enrollment for people 
who become covered under an employer plan, and those who leave the program as income 
disregards are eliminated.  
State spending for employee health benefits would increase by $45.4 billion under the Act. This 
reflects the cost of covering state and local workers who do not now have coverage and/or the 
cost of the penalty for uninsured workers. It also reflects the impact of the various excise taxes 
on the cost of health benefits for workers and retirees.   
The primary source of savings for state and local governments would be attributed to safety-net 
programs that provide funding to providers such as free clinics and public hospitals. Due to the 
expansion in insurance coverage, safety-net providers would be reimbursed for the services that 
under current law they would have provided free to the uninsured. Thus, these providers 
would see an increase in net income, which could be used either to provide additional services 
or reduce state and local funding for these providers.  
Some states also sponsor subsidized insurance programs for low-income people who are not 
eligible for Medicaid under federal rules. These programs would be largely superseded by the 
expanded Medicaid program and the new premium subsidy program under the Act, resulting 
in savings to these state and local governments. Alternatively, the Act permits states to continue 
operation of existing health benefits programs such as the “Basic Health Plan” in Washington. 
State and local governments would generally see net savings through the 2020 through 2029 
period as well.  
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Figure 12 
Changes in Spending and Revenues for State and Local Governments under the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009: 2010 – 2029 
(billions) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
2010-
2019 
 
Spending under Current Law $445.3 $472.5 $501.3 $533.5 $569.4 $609.3 $652.5 $699.6 $750.5 $805.2 $6,039.1  
Medicaid and CHIP Programs -$0.2 -$0.2 -$0.2 -$2.1 -$1.2 $2.0 $3.2 $3.6 $4.2 $5.2 $14.4  
Savings to Current Safety-net 
programs $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 -$9.6 -$6.9 -$16.6 -$19.9 -$21.4 -$23.1 -$24.8 -$122.2 
 
State and Local Government 
Worker Health Benefits Programs $1.0 $1.7 $2.4 $2.8 $3.5 $4.0 $5.6 $6.7 $8.0 $9.7 $45.4 
 
Tax Revenues From Wage Effects 
(Counted as Offset) -$0.1 -$0.1 -$0.1 $0.1 $0.2 -$0.1 -$0.2 -$0.3 -$0.4 -$0.5 -$1.3 
 
Net Impact on State and Local 
Governments $0.7 $1.5 $2.1 -$8.8 -$4.4 -$10.6 -$11.3 -$11.3 -$11.2 -$10.5 -$63.7 
 
  Percent Change in Spending 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% -1.6% -0.8% -1.7% -1.7% -1.6% -1.5% -1.3% -1.1%  
 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 
2020-
2029 
2010-
2029 
Spending Under Current Law $864.2 $927.7 $996.0 $1,069.6 $1,148.9 $1,234.3 $1,326.3 $1,425.5 $1,532.5 $1,647.8 $12,172.8 $18,211.9 
Medicaid and CHIP Programs $5.6 $6.0 $6.5 $7.0 $7.5 $8.1 $8.7 $9.4 $10.1 $10.8 $79.5 $93.9 
Savings to Current Safety-net 
Programs -$26.7 -$28.8 -$31.0 -$33.4 -$35.9 -$38.7 -$41.7 -$44.9 -$48.3 -$52.0 -$381.5 -$503.7 
State and Local Government 
Worker Health Benefits Programs $10.8 $12.2 $13.7 $15.5 $17.6 $19.6 $21.9 $24.4 $27.2 $30.3 $193.2 $238.6 
Tax Revenues From Wage Effects 
(Counted As Offset) -$0.6 -$0.7 -$0.8 -$1.0 -$1.2 -$1.3 -$1.5 -$1.8 -$2.0 -$2.3 -$13.2 -$14.4 
Net Impact on State and Local      
Governments -$10.9 -$11.3 -$11.6 -$11.9 -$12.0 -$12.4 -$12.6 -$12.9 -$13.1 -$13.2 -$121.9 -$185.6 
  Percent Change in Spending -1.3% -1.2% -1.2% -1.1% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -0.9% -0.9% -0.8% -1.0% -1.0% 
Source: Lewin Group Estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM) 
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D. Private Employer Impacts 
The Act includes features that would encourage employers to offer coverage. For example, the 
Act includes a tax credit for small employers who offer coverage. Firms with over 50 workers 
also face a penalty of up to $400 per fulltime worker for uninsured workers who receive a 
premium tax credit through the exchange. In addition, the mandate for all Americans to have 
coverage is likely to increase worker demand for employer coverage, which often can be 
provided at a lower cost by employer groups.  
However, the availability of the expanded Medicaid program and premium subsidies for lower-
wage workers could cause some employers to discontinue coverage. This is particularly true of 
low-wage employers where workers can obtain publicly subsidized coverage for less than it 
costs the employer to provide the same coverage. In fact, as discussed above, we estimate that 
there would be a net reduction in the number of workers and dependents with employer 
provided health insurance of 7.3 million people once fully implemented.  
1. Employer Health Spending 
Total spending for private ESI will be about $452.4 billion in 2011 (Figure 13). This includes the 
value of the employer share of the cost of health insurance among private employers.4  
Spending for workers and dependents will be $423.6 billion while spending for retiree health 
benefits will be about $28.8 billion.  
Spending for currently insuring firms would decline by $23.0 billion under the Act, assuming it 
is fully implemented in 2011. Employer premium payments would decline by about $42.2 
billion, reflecting our estimate that about 19.1 million workers and dependents would be in 
plans where employers would eliminate their coverage under the Act. This reflects the “crowd-
out” expected as subsidized coverage under Medicaid and the exchange becomes available. 
Employer penalty payments for uninsured workers receiving a premium credit in the exchange 
would be $8.0 billion.  
Currently insuring firms would also receive about $4.0 billion under the small employer tax 
credit. These credits would last for two years only.   
As discussed above, we assume that most of the cost of the new excise taxes is passed back to 
employers and consumers in the form of higher premiums. In 2011, this would add $13.4 billion 
to premiums for private firms that continue to offer coverage. The reductions in payments for 
provider services under Medicare and Medicaid would result in increases cost-shifting, which 
would increase the cost shift to currently insured firms by about $1.6 billion in that year.   
 
 
 
                                                     
4 The impact on health benefits costs for government employees is incorporated into our public spending estimates 
presented above.  
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Figure 13 
Change in Private Employer Health Benefit Costs by Current 
Insuring Status under the America’s Healthy Future Act for 2011 (billions) a/ 
All Firms Eligible for Exchange 
  
Currently 
Insuring 
Employer 
Currently 
Non-
Insuring 
Employer 
All 
Employers 
Private Employer Spending under Current Law 
Current Cost of Coverage       
   Workers and Dependents $423.6  $0.0  $423.6  
   Retirees $28.8  $0.0  $28.8  
Total Current Law $452.4  $0.0  $452.4  
Private Employer Health Spending under the Act 
Premiums for Employers $381.4 $9.1 $390.5 
Impact of Excise Tax on High 
Cost Premiums $7.6 $0.1 $7.4 
Impact of other Excise Taxes $6.3 $0.1 $6.2 
Costs for Retirees $28.5 $0.0 $28.5 
Change in Cost Shift $1.6 $0.0 $2.1 
Small Employer Tax Credit -$4.0 -$1.0 -$5.0 
Penalty for Uninsured Workers $8.0 $0.9 $8.9 
Total Spending Under The 
Policy $429.4 $9.2 $438.6 
Net Change in Private Employer Spending 
Net Change -$23.0 $9.2 -$13.8 
a/ For illustrative purposes, this scenario Assumes that the Act is fully implemented and 
enrollment is fully matured in 2011.  
Source: Lewin Group Estimates Using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM) 
Firms that currently do not offer coverage to any of their employees would see an increase in 
spending of $9.2 billion. However, nearly all of this would be attributed to firms that decide to 
offer coverage rather than pay the penalty. These firms would pay only about $0.9 billion in 
penalty payments, reflecting that many workers in non-insuring firms already have coverage as 
a dependent of a spouse with employer coverage or from other sources such as Medicare. Small 
firms that start to offer coverage would receive about $1.0 billion through the small employer 
tax credit.  
 2. Long-Term Impact on Private Employer Spending 
Total health spending for private employers nationwide would fall by about 3.3 percent once 
fully implemented in 2014, largely due to discontinuations of coverage. But employer cost 
under the Act would increase above current spending levels after 2016. Private employer health 
spending would actually decline by about $19.9 billion over the 2010 through 2019 period 
(Figure 14).  
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Figure 14 
Changes in Private Employer Health Spending under the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009 
Change in Spending under the Act 
 
Spending 
under 
Current Law Excise Taxes 
in Premiums 
Cost 
Shifting 
Coverage 
and 
Penalty 
Provisions
Total 
Change in 
Spending 
under the 
Act 
Percent 
Change in 
Total 
Spending 
under the Act 
2010 $433.3 $5.5 -$1.7 $0.7 $4.4 1.0% 
2011 $453.8 $6.1 -$1.2 -$2.6 $2.2 0.5% 
2012 $474.8 $6.3 $0.6 -$5.3 $1.5 0.3% 
2013 $498.2 $13.7 $0.0 -$27.3 -$13.6 -2.7% 
2014 $525.5 $18.5 $1.6 -$37.2 -$17.1 -3.3% 
2015 $555.9 $21.3 $1.7 -$28.6 -$5.7 -1.0% 
2016 $588.5 $23.9 $2.3 -$28.9 -$2.8 -0.5% 
2017 $623.7 $27.0 $3.2 -$30.4 -$0.1 0.0% 
2018 $660.7 $30.7 $4.3 -$31.7 $3.3 0.5% 
2019 $700.0 $35.0 $6.0 -$33.2 $7.9 1.1% 
2020 $741.5 $39.6 $6.5 -$34.7 $11.3 1.5% 
2021 $785.6 $44.8 $7.0 -$36.3 $15.5 2.0% 
2022 $832.2 $50.9 $7.6 -$37.8 $20.6 2.5% 
2023 $881.7 $58.0 $8.1 -$39.4 $26.7 3.0% 
2024 $934.0 $66.2 $8.7 -$40.8 $34.0 3.6% 
2025 $989.5 $74.5 $9.2 -$42.5 $41.1 4.2% 
2026 $1,048.3 $83.9 $9.6 -$44.1 $49.4 4.7% 
2027 $1,110.6 $94.6 $9.9 -$45.7 $58.8 5.3% 
2028 $1,176.5 $106.8 $9.9 -$47.2 $69.5 5.9% 
2029 $1,246.4 $120.8 $9.5 -$48.6 $81.6 6.5% 
2010-2019 $5,514.4 $187.9 $16.7 -$224.6 -$19.9 -0.4% 
2020-2029 $9,746.4 $740.0 $86.0 -$417.2 $408.7 4.2% 
2010-2029 $15,260.8 $927.8 $102.7 -$641.8 $388.8 2.5% 
Source: Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
We estimate that employer costs would increase by about $187.9 billion as the cost of the 
various excise taxes is passed on to payers over the 2020 through 2019 period.  Cost-shifting 
would add another $16.7 billion to employer costs over this period. Employers would save 
$224.6 billion due to other program effects over this period, primarily due to reductions in the 
number of employers offering coverage.  
Private employer health spending would increase by about $408.7 billion over the 2020 through 
2029 period. These increases in spending are driven by the increasing amount of the excise tax 
on high-cost plans and growing cost-shifting from increasing reductions in payments for 
services under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Over the following decade, employers 
would pay an additional $740 billion in excise taxes and would see cost-shifting of $86.0 billion 
(Figure 12).  
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3. Impact on Employer Costs by Industry and Firm Size 
Figure 15 presents our estimates of the average change in employer health spending per worker 
for private employers by firm size, industry and current insuring status, assuming the program 
is fully implemented in 2011. Firms that now offer insurance to at least some of their workers 
would see a net reduction in health spending averaging $268 per employee. This reflects 
primarily the reductions in employer coverage under the Act.    
By comparison, firms that do not now offer insurance would see an increase in health spending 
per worker of about $301 per year. This includes the cost of benefits for employers who decide 
to offer insurance and penalty payments for employers who continue not to offer coverage. The 
average change in employer spending across all employers (currently insuring and non-
insuring) would be reduction of $118 per worker. Small firms currently offering insurance 
would see savings averaging $950 per worker, reflecting the new employer tax credit and the 
advantage of purchasing coverage through the exchanges under the Act.   
Figure 15 
Change in Employer Health Spending per Worker under the America’s Healthy Future Act Assuming 
it is Fully Implemented in 2011/a 
 
Currently 
Insuring 
Firms 
Currently 
Non-insuring 
Firms 
All Firms 
Firm Size (number of workers) 
Fewer than 10 -$950 $410 -$216 
10-24 -$776 $275 -$301 
25-99 -$464 $204 -$275 
100-499 -$151 $231 -$83 
500-999 -$26 $184 $7 
1,000-4,999 -$105 $261 $0 
5,000 or more $42 $0 $42 
Industry 
Construction -$299 $2 $2 
Manufacturing -$324 -$230 -$230 
Transportation -$136 -$14 -$14 
Wholesale Trade -$137 -$63 -$63 
Retail Trade -$312 -$171 -$171 
Services -$222 -$78 -$78 
Finance -$356 -$234 -$234 
Other -$396 -$133 -$133 
All Private Employers 
Total Private -$268 $301 -$118 
a/ For illustrative purposes, this scenario assumes that the Act is fully implemented and 
enrollment is fully matured in 2011.  
Source: Lewin Group Estimates Using the Health benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
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E. Impact on Consumers 
Under current law, families will spend an average of about $4,193 per family for health care in 
2011 (Figure 16). This includes average premium payments of $2,648 and average out-of-pocket 
expenses for health services of $1,545. Premiums include the amounts paid for individual non-
group coverage and employee contributions for ESI. Out-of-pocket expenses include 
deductibles and co-payments for covered services as well as family spending for services not 
covered by insurance. These include amounts spent by families out-of-pocket for services by the 
uninsured.  
Figure 16 
Average Family Health Spending by Family Income under Current Law in 2011 
Spending under Current Law 
 
Number of 
Families 
(thousands) 
Average 
Premium 
Average 
Out-of-
Pocket 
Average 
Total 
Spending 
Families by Annual Family Income 
Under $10,000 13,257 $479 $717 $1,196 
$10,000-$19,999 15,579 $1,124 $831 $1,955 
$20,000-$29,999 14,716 $1,828 $1,143 $2,971 
$30,000-$39,999 14,434 $2,200 $1,285 $3,485 
$40,000-$49,999 11,759 $2,684 $1,576 $4,260 
$50,000-$74,999 21,278 $3,055 $1,671 $4,726 
$75,000-$99,999 15,403 $3,721 $1,978 $5,699 
$100,000-$149,999 16,203 $3,988 $2,103 $6,091 
$150,000 or More 13,135 $4,449 $2,540 $6,989 
All Families 
All Families 135,765 $2,648 $1,545 $4,193 
Source: Lewin Group Estimates Using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
Average annual health spending would increase by $218 per family under the Act (Figure 17). 
Premium expenses would increase by about $3 per family. However, with incomes below 
$50,000 would generally pay less for premiums due to the Medicaid expansion and the 
premium tax credit under the Act.  
Out-of-pocket spending would increase by an average of $130 per family, partly due to 
increased utilization of health services for newly insured individuals. It also reflects that the 
“Bronze” health plan under the Act would have relatively higher cost-sharing than typical 
employer coverage.  
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Figure 17 
Changes in Family Health Spending under the America’s Healthy Future Act by Family Income in 
2011 a/ 
 
Change in 
Premiums 
Change in 
Out-of 
Pocket 
Penalty 
Payments 
After tax 
Wage 
Effects b/ 
Net Change 
in Spending 
Under $10,000 -$218 -$179 $8 $56 -$445 
$10,000-$19,999 -$102 -$124 $17 $62 -$271 
$20,000-$29,999 -$150 $19 $67 $140 -$204 
$30,000-$39,999 -$102 $98 $70 $103 -$37 
$40,000-$49,999 -$15 $118 $95 -$16 $214 
$50,000-$74,999 $145 $294 $133 $40 $532 
$75,000-$99,999 $143 $295 $195 $47 $586 
$100,000-$149,999 $138 $257 $243 $0 $638 
$150,000 or More $96 $304 $316 -$60 $776 
All Families $3 $130 $128 $43 $218 
a/ For illustrative purposes, this scenario Assumes that the Act is fully implemented and 
enrollment is fully matured in 2011.  
b/ Increases to wages are counted as a reduction in family health care costs.  
Source: Lewin Group Estimates Using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
We also estimate that average annual after-tax wages would decline by about $43 per family 
due to increased spending for health by employers. In this analysis, we assume that changes in 
employer health benefits costs – whether they are increases or decreases - are passed back to 
workers in the form of wage adjustments. This is based upon research on changes in wages 
associated with increased spending for employee health benefits.5 Thus, an increase in employer 
costs is passed back to workers as reduced wage growth over time, while reductions in 
employer costs are passed on as increased wage growth.6 In this analysis, we treat the reduction 
in wages due to increases in employer costs as an increase in family health care spending. 
While families overall would see an increase in health care spending (i.e., $218 per family), the 
change in spending would vary widely with the age of the family head (Figure 18). Health 
spending would increase by $388 per family headed by someone age 25 to 34. The increase in 
spending declines as age increases. Family spending would increase by about $180 per family 
for families headed by someone age 55 to 64, reflects limitations on premium variation by age 
under the insurance reform provisions of the Act (i.e., the Act limits premium variation with 
age to 4:1).  
                                                     
5  See, for example, James Heckman, "What Has Been Learned About Labor Supply in the Past Twenty years?" 
American Economic Review, (May 1993). 
6  See, for example, Jonathan Gruber and Alan B. Kreuger, "The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided 
Insurance: Lessons from Workers Compensation Insurance," in Tax Policy and the Economy (1991); Jonathan 
Gruber, "The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits," American Economic Review, (forthcoming); and 
Lawrence H. Summers, "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review (May 1989). 
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Figure 18 
Changes in Average Family Health Spending under the America’s Healthy Future Act by Age of 
Family Head: 2011 a/,b/ 
 
a/ For illustrative purposes, this scenario Assumes that the Act is fully implemented and enrollment is 
fully matured in 2011. 
b/ Does not reflect changes in Medicare premiums and reductions in benefits due to changes in the MA 
program.  
Source:  The Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
The Act would provide the greatest savings to those who have high health care expenses under 
current law. Savings would average about $2,000 for families that would experience total family 
health spending of $10,000 or more under current law (Figure 19). By contrast, families that 
would have had health expenses of less than $1,000 under current law would spend an average 
of $708 more per family under the Act.  
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Figure 19 
Changes in Average Family Health Spending by Current Insured Status and Current Family Spending 
Level under the America’s Healthy Future Act: 2011 a/ 
a/ For illustrative purposes, this scenario Assumes that the Act is fully implemented and enrollment is 
fully matured in 2011. 
Source:  The Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
The impact of the Act on families would vary with the current insured status of family 
members. Families where all members would have been insured under current law would save 
an average of $8 per family per year (Figure 20). Insured families with annual incomes of less 
than $50,000 per year would on average see savings. For example, savings would average about 
$500 per insured family for those with annual incomes between $20,000 and $30,000.  
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Figure 20 
Changes in Average Annual Family Health Spending by Family Income and Current Insured Status 
under the America’s Healthy Future Act, Assuming full Implementation in 2011a/ 
 
a/ For illustrative purposes, this scenario Assumes that the Act is fully implemented and enrollment is 
fully matured in 2011. 
Source:  The Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
However, spending for families who currently have one or more uninsured members would 
pay about $1,205 per family more for health than they would under current law. This reflects 
the cost of coverage and/or penalties for failing to have insurance. Because the uninsured tend 
to be younger and relatively low users of health services, the cost of insurance for this group 
generally would be greater than what they save in out-of-pocket health care costs by having 
coverage.  
In Figure 21 we present estimates of the change in total health expenditures for all families 
under the Act.  
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Figure 21 
Changes in Health Spending for Families under the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009 (billions) 
 
Total 
Household 
Health Spending 
Change in Health 
Spending Percent Change 
2010 $722.3 $4.3 0.6% 
2011 $755.8 $10.1 1.4% 
2012 $788.6 $11.9 1.6% 
2013 $831.3 -$3.6 -0.3% 
2014 $875.6 $14.1 1.8% 
2015 $926.7 $31.0 3.5% 
2016 $983.5 $36.3 3.9% 
2017 $1,044.0 $43.2 4.4% 
2018 $1,109.4 $49.3 4.7% 
2019 $1,175.3 $57.0 5.2% 
2020 $1,249.2 $62.0 5.3% 
2021 $1,327.8 $68.1 5.5% 
2022 $1,411.8 $75.0 5.6% 
2023 $1,501.1 $83.3 5.9% 
2024 $1,596.0 $92.6 6.1% 
2025 $1,696.9 $101.8 6.3% 
2026 $1,804.3 $112.0 6.6% 
2027 $1,918.5 $123.7 6.8% 
2028 $2,039.7 $136.5 7.0% 
2029 $2,168.5 $150.6 7.3% 
2010-2019 $9,212.5 $253.6 2.9% 
2020-2029 $16,713.7 $1,005.4 6.4% 
2010-2029 $25,926.3 $1,259.0 5.1% 
Source: Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
F. Impact on National Health Spending 
The actuaries of the CMS estimate that national health spending will reach $2.77 trillion in 2011. 
This includes expenditures for health services, prescription drugs, medical equipment, public 
health, research and construction. It includes the amounts spent by all payer groups including 
the federal government, state and local governments, employers and families.  
In this analysis, we estimated the change in total health spending in the U.S., regardless of 
payer source for 2010 through 2029. Also, to illustrate the impact of the Act on national health 
spending, we estimated its effect on health expenditures assuming that the program is fully 
implemented and enrollment is fully mature in 2011.  
1. Changes in National Health Spending  
We estimate that national health spending would increase by about $36.3 billion if the Act were 
fully implemented in 2011 (Figure 22).  We estimate an overall increase in utilization of health 
services of roughly $34.6 billion for the newly insured and those obtaining improved coverage. 
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In addition, utilization of health services would increase by another $2.7 billion for people who 
now have improved coverage due to the Act.  
Figure 22 
Change in National Health Spending Under the America’s Healthy Future Act Assuming Full 
Implementation in 2011 (billions) a/ 
  
Changes in National 
Health Spending 
National Health Spending in 2011   $2,770.3  
Changes in Health Spending under the Act 
Net Change in Spending for Health Services  $31.2 
  Change in Utilization for Newly Insured $34.6  
  Change in Utilization due to Improved Coverage $2.7  
  Change in Utilization due to Excise Taxes -$4.9  
  Connector Competition Effect -$1.2  
Change in Provider Income    -$1.3 
  Payments for Formerly Uncompensated Care $16.5  
  Change in Provider Payment Rates    
     Enrollees Moving from Private Coverage to Medicaid -$3.7  
     Enrollees Moving from Medicaid to Private Coverage  $3.7  
     Medicare and Medicaid payment reductions b/ -$18.7  
     Increased Cost Shifting (Assumes 40 percent passed 
to Payers) $0.9  
Other Medicare and Medicaid  -0.7 
Change in Insurer Administrative Costs  $7.1 
   Change in Insurer Administration (including Medicaid) $4.6  
   Administration of Subsidies $2.5  
     Net Change in National Health Spending  $36.3 
a/ For illustrative purposes, this figure shows the impact of the Act assuming the program is 
fully implemented and enrollment is fully matured in 2011. 
b/ This is the reduction in federal spending for provider payments under Medicare and Medicaid 
estimated by the CBO for 2014 (adjusted to 2011 levels), which is the first year of the coverage 
expansion provisions of the Act.   
Source: Lewin Group Estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
We estimate savings of about $1.2 billion due to increased competition through the exchange. In 
addition, we estimate a spending reduction of $4.9 billion due to the excise tax. This reflects our 
assumption (discussed above) that the excise taxes will be passed on to consumers as higher 
premiums, which would be associated with a small reduction in health service utilization (i.e., 
price effect).  
We estimate an overall increase in insurer administrative costs for private insurance and public 
programs of $7.1 billion under the Act. This includes the cost of administering coverage for the 
newly insured and the cost of processing incomes to determine eligibility for Medicaid and the 
premium tax credit.  
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There are several features of the proposal that would affect provider payments for services, 
which would have an impact on provider cost shifting. Providers now would be paid for 
services that under current law would have been provided free as uncompensated care, adding 
$16.5 billion to provider incomes. Provider reimbursement would increase by about $3.7 billion 
for those now covered under Medicaid who would become covered by employers who decide 
to offer coverage to avoid the employer penalty. Similarly, there would be a reduction in 
reimbursement of $3.7 billion for people who shift to Medicaid from employer coverage in cases 
where an employer has decided to discontinue coverage under the Act.  
However, proposed reductions in provider payments under Medicare and Medicaid would 
reduce provider revenues for the services they provide by $18.7 billion if fully implemented in 
2011 (based upon CBO estimated savings for 2013, adjusted to 2011 spending levels). The 
combined impact of these changes would be a net reduction in provider reimbursement of $2.2 
billion. This includes the reductions in reimbursement under Medicare less the increase in 
revenues from reduced uncompensated care.  
Based upon the available research, we assume that 40 percent of any net change in provider 
reimbursement levels under public programs and/or reduction in uncompensated care would 
be passed back to the consumers in the form of a change in for private insurers. This results in a 
net increase in the cost-shift of $900 million.  
 2. Long-term Impacts on Cost-shifting  
The theory of cost shifting is that health care providers will pass-on at least some portion of the 
cost of uncompensated care and shortfalls in provider reimbursement to privately insured 
people in the form of increased charges for services. Thus, reductions in provider 
reimbursement under public programs are likely to result in increased costs for privately 
insured people. 
In evaluating the impact of reform on the cost shift, it is important to distinguish provider 
payment reductions from reductions in beneficiary services. For example, of the $404.2 billion in 
Medicare and Medicaid reductions in the Act, only about $241.9 billion would be in the form of 
payment reductions. The reductions in payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans would 
cause plans to reduce the additional benefits provided to beneficiaries under the program, but 
are unlikely to affect provider payments. The Act also includes a temporary increases in Part B 
premiums for higher income beneficiaries of about $22.2 billion, which would increase costs to 
beneficiaries, but would not directly affect provider payments. 
As discussed above, it is important to offset these reductions in reimbursement with increases 
in reimbursement due to reduced uncompensated care and any change in enrollment under 
Medicaid, which pay providers substantially less than both Medicare and private insurers. We 
then assume that the cost-shift will be equal to 40 percent of the net change in reimbursement. 
Using these assumptions, we estimate a net increase in the cost-shift of about $34.4 billion over 
the 2010 through 2019 period, and $190.9 billion over the following decade Figure 23. 
Our assumption that 40 percent of these changes in reimbursement are passed back to private 
payers is based upon studies of the effect of reductions in provider reimbursement. There are 
two separate studies indicating that about one-half of hospital payment shortfalls are passed-on 
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to private payers in the form of higher charges.7 However, two other studies showed 
considerably less evidence of hospital cost-shifting, although they did not rule out a partial cost-
shift.8  
Figure 23 
Estimated Cost Shift Resulting from the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009 
 
Reductions in 
Uncompensated 
Care 
People 
Moving from 
Private to 
Medicaid 
People 
Moving 
from 
Medicaid 
to Private 
Changes in 
Medicare 
and 
Medicaid 
Provider 
Payments 
Total Net 
Change 
In Provider  
Reimbursement 
Amount of 
Cost Shift a/ 
2010 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $9.0 $9.0 -$3.6 
2011 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $6.3 $6.3 -$2.5 
2012 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 -$3.1 -$3.1 $1.2 
2013 $7.5 $0.0 $1.7 -$9.2 $0.0 $0.0 
2014 $18.1 -$1.8 $4.0 -$28.7 -$8.4 $3.4 
2015 $21.6 -$4.4 $4.8 -$30.6 -$8.5 $3.4 
2016 $23.2 -$5.2 $5.2 -$34.9 -$11.7 $4.7 
2017 $25.1 -$5.6 $5.6 -$41.7 -$16.6 $6.7 
2018 $27.0 -$6.0 $6.0 -$49.0 -$22.0 $8.8 
2019 $29.0 -$6.5 $6.5 -$60.0 -$31.0 $12.4 
2020 $31.3 -$7.0 $7.0 -$64.5 -$33.3 $13.3 
2021 $33.7 -$7.6 $7.6 -$69.7 -$36.0 $14.4 
2022 $36.3 -$8.1 $8.1 -$75.1 -$38.9 $15.5 
2023 $39.1 -$8.8 $8.8 -$80.9 -$41.8 $16.7 
2024 $42.1 -$9.4 $9.4 -$86.7 -$44.6 $17.8 
2025 $45.3 -$10.2 $10.2 -$92.6 -$47.3 $18.9 
2026 $48.8 -$10.9 $10.9 -$98.3 -$49.5 $19.8 
2027 $52.5 -$11.8 $11.8 -$103.5 -$51.0 $20.4 
2028 $56.6 -$12.7 $12.7 -$107.7 -$51.1 $19.6 
2029 $60.9 -$13.7 $13.7 -$109.8 -$48.9 $34.4 
2010-2019 $151.4 -$29.5 $34.0 -$241.9 -$86.0 $34.4 
2020-2029 $446.4 -$100.1 $100.1 -$888.8 -$442.4 $190.9 
2010-2029 $597.9 -$129.7 $134.1 -$1,130.7 -$528.5 $225.4 
a/ Assumed that 40 percent of the net change in provider reimbursement and uncompensated care is 
passed back to the privately insured as increased charges.   
Source: Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
One study of physician pricing by Thomas Rice et al., showed that for each one percent 
reduction in physician payments under public programs, private sector prices increased by 0.2 
                                                     
7 Dranove, David, “Pricing by Non-Profit Institutions: The Case of Hospital Cost Shifting,” Journal of Health 
Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1998); and Sloan, Frank and Becker, Edward, “Cross-Subsidies and Payment for 
Hospital Care,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 8., No. 4 (Winter 1984) 
8  Zuckerman, Stephen, “Commercial Insurers and All-Payer Regulation,” Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 6. No. 2 
(September 1987); and Hadley, Jack and Feder, Judy, “Hospital Cost Shifting and Care for the Uninsured,” Health 
Affairs, Vol. 4 No. 3 (Fall 1985) 
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percent.9 Our own analysis of hospital data indicates that about 40 percent of the increase in 
hospital payment shortfalls (i.e., revenues minus costs) in public programs were passed-on to 
private-payers in the form of the cost shift during the years studied.10   
3. Spending by Payer Group 
Figure 24 presents our estimates of the changes in health spending for four major payer groups: 
the federal government, state and local governments, private employers and families. We 
present these estimates with and without expected wage effects. As discussed above, we 
assume that increases in employer health spending under the mandate would be passed back to 
workers in the form of reduced wage growth, which has implications for federal and state 
income and payroll tax revenues.  
                                                     
9  Rice, Thomas, et al., “Physician Response to Medicare Payment Reductions: Impacts on public and Private 
Sectors,” Robert Wood Johnson Grant No. 20038, September 1994. 
10  Sheils, J., Claxton, G., “Potential Cost Shifting Under Proposed Funding Reductions for Medicare and Medicaid: 
The Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995,” (Report to the National Coalition on Health Care), The Lewin Group, 
December 6, 1995 
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Figure 24 
Changes in Health Spending By Payer Group under the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009: 2010-2029 (billions) 
Before Accounting for Wage and Tax Effects After Accounting for Wage and Tax Effects 
 
Change 
in Net 
Federal 
Spending 
State & 
Local 
Govern-
ment 
Spending 
Private 
Employer 
Spending 
Family 
Health 
Spending 
Total 
Health 
Spending 
Change 
in Net 
Federal 
Spending 
State & 
Local 
Govern-
ment 
Spending 
Private 
Employer 
Spending 
Family 
Health 
Spending 
Total 
Health 
Spending 
2010 $0.5 $0.8 $4.4 $0.7 $6.4 -$0.4 $0.7 $1.8 $4.3 $6.4 
2011 -$8.3 $1.6 $2.2 $8.3 $3.8 -$9.0 $1.5 $1.2 $10.1 $3.8 
2012 -$18.9 $2.2 $1.5 $10.7 -$4.5 -$19.6 $2.1 $1.1 $11.9 -$4.5 
2013 -$29.2 -$8.9 -$13.6 $8.0 -$43.7 -$27.8 -$8.8 -$3.5 -$3.6 -$43.7 
2014 -$10.5 -$4.6 -$17.1 $29.0 -$3.2 -$8.8 -$4.4 -$4.1 $14.1 -$3.2 
2015 $22.1 -$10.5 -$5.7 $36.0 $41.9 $21.4 -$10.6 $0.1 $31.0 $41.9 
2016 $22.7 -$11.1 -$2.8 $38.6 $47.4 $21.0 -$11.3 $1.4 $36.3 $47.4 
2017 $14.9 -$11.0 -$0.1 $42.9 $46.8 $12.3 -$11.3 $2.6 $43.2 $46.8 
2018 $7.2 -$10.8 $3.3 $45.9 $45.5 $3.5 -$11.2 $3.9 $49.3 $45.5 
2019 -$3.4 -$10.0 $7.9 $49.4 $43.9 -$8.4 -$10.5 $5.8 $57.0 $43.9 
2020 -$4.9 -$10.3 $11.3 $51.2 $47.3 -$10.9 -$10.9 $7.1 $62.0 $47.3 
2021 -$7.5 -$10.6 $15.5 $53.5 $50.9 -$14.6 -$11.3 $8.7 $68.1 $50.9 
2022 -$10.6 -$10.8 $20.6 $55.7 $54.9 -$19.1 -$11.6 $10.6 $75.0 $54.9 
2023 -$14.8 -$10.9 $26.7 $58.3 $59.4 -$24.8 -$11.9 $12.8 $83.3 $59.4 
2024 -$19.6 -$10.8 $34.0 $60.8 $64.5 -$31.5 -$12.0 $15.4 $92.6 $64.5 
2025 -$23.6 -$11.1 $41.1 $63.5 $70.0 -$37.3 -$12.4 $17.9 $101.8 $70.0 
2026 -$27.9 -$11.1 $49.4 $66.0 $76.3 -$43.7 -$12.6 $20.7 $112.0 $76.3 
2027 -$32.6 -$11.1 $58.8 $68.7 $83.8 -$50.8 -$12.9 $23.8 $123.7 $83.8 
2028 -$37.1 -$11.1 $69.5 $71.4 $92.7 -$58.0 -$13.1 $27.4 $136.5 $92.7 
2029 -$41.0 -$10.9 $81.6 $74.1 $103.8 -$64.8 -$13.2 $31.3 $150.6 $103.8 
2010-2019 -$3.0 -$62.4 -$19.9 $269.6 $184.2 -$15.9 -$63.7 $10.2 $253.6 $184.2 
2020-2029 -$219.5 -$108.7 $408.7 $623.2 $703.7 -$355.4 -$121.9 $175.6 $1,005.4 $703.7 
2010-2029 -$222.4 -$171.2 $388.8 $892.7 $887.9 -$371.3 -$185.6 $185.8 $1,259.0 $887.9 
a/ Reflects changes in wages for employer health spending among non-government employers only. 
b/ Changes in employer costs attributed to retirees are retained as costs to the employer because retiree costs have no impact on labor 
markets for workers.   
Source: Lewin Group Estimates Using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
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Appendix A 
Simulation of the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009  
We estimated the cost and coverage impacts of The America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009 using 
The Lewin Group Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). To facilitate comparison of these 
proposals, we adopted a standard set of data and assumptions that were applied uniformly 
across all of our similar studies. While it is difficult to predict the precise impact of these 
proposals, the use of a standard methodology assures that comparisons of results across plans 
reflect differences in program design rather than mere inconsistencies in assumptions.  
The HBSM is a micro-simulation model of the US health care system. Central to its design is a 
“base case” scenario depicting the distribution of health insurance coverage, as well as 
expenditures across a representative sample of households in the US under current policy for a 
base year. We assumed the base year to be 2010. The resulting database provides a detailed 
accounting of coverage and spending in the US health care system for consumers, employers, 
state and local governments and the federal government.  
We used the model to simulate the effect of the Bill on the number of people with health 
insurance from public and private sources. We estimated changes in health care costs for major 
payers for health services including households, employers and governments. The impact of 
each proposal is determined by calculating the difference between coverage and health 
spending levels under each proposal and coverage and spending levels under current law (i.e., 
our baseline simulation). Estimates of employer effects are provided by firm size, industry, 
earnings levels and current insuring status. Changes in consumer spending are provided by 
income, age, current insured status and various demographic characteristics. 
In this analysis, we projected the impact of each health reform proposal on health spending and 
the federal budget for the 2010 through 2019 period. In developing these projections, we used 
assumptions developed by the Office of the Actuary of CMS on the growth in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), population growth and the growth, in health spending by type of service and 
source of payment. A full documentation of HBSM and the data used is available upon request. 
A. Population Data 
Our baseline household data is based upon the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS) 
data for 2002 through 2005, which are the most recent complete MEPS data now available. 
These data provide detailed information on health insurance coverage, health spending by type 
of service and source of payment, income and employment status and the demographic 
composition of the population. These data were adjusted to reflect more recent information on 
the distribution of the population by source of coverage, income, employment status and other 
socio-demographic characteristics provided in the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 2007.11  
                                                     
11  Both the MEPS and the CPS data are corrected for under-reporting of Medicaid coverage, which is quite severe in 
the CPS. These databases provide comparable variable definitions that permit us to perform these necessary 
adjustments.  
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These data were then “aged” to be representative of the US population in 2006, which is the 
base year of the analysis. We used population growth projections from the Bureau of the Census 
and income growth assumptions consistent with those used by the Office of the Actuary of the 
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in developing their health spending 
projections. We then adjusted the health spending data reported by households in the MEPS to 
replicate the distribution of total personal health expenditures by type of service and source of 
payment.  
B. Simulation of Medicaid Eligibility and Enrollment 
The Bill includes an expansion in eligibility for the Medicaid and SCHIP programs. We 
simulated this using the CPS data for 2007. We used these data to identify people eligible for 
these programs under current law using the actual income eligibility levels used in each state 
under current law by class of eligibility (i.e., children, parents and childless adults). We then 
used the model to identify the number of people who would be eligible for coverage under the 
plan including parents and non-custodial adults living below 150 percent of the FPL. 
The impact of these expansions will vary across states, due to the wide variation in income 
eligibility levels under the current Medicaid program. Although eligibility levels vary 
considerably across states, children are usually covered up to 200 percent of the FPL. Parents 
are eligible if their income is below levels averaging about 50 percent of the FPL. Noncustodial, 
nondisabled adults generally are not eligible at any income level, except in about 6 states that 
have been granted waivers to cover this population. 
Once we identified the newly eligible population, we estimated the number of people who 
would enroll using multivariate analyses of historical enrollment levels under the existing 
program. These analyses show how enrollment varies with age, income, eligibility group and 
whether they have access to employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). The model also shows how 
enrollment levels are affected when participants are required to pay a premium, as is done in 
some states for people at the higher end of the eligibility scale. 
Our program cost estimates were estimated using the health spending data in HBSM for those 
who are simulated to become covered under the expansion. For newly insured people, we 
assumed that their utilization of health services would increase to the levels reported by insured 
people with similar age, gender, income and health status characteristics.  
C. Premium Subsidies 
The Bill would provide subsidies to assist people in purchasing private insurance coverage. In 
our analysis, we assume that people treat these subsidies as a reduction in their cost of health 
insurance. We assume that these subsidies induce some of the uninsured to choose to purchase 
non-group coverage. We estimate the number of people who obtain insurance, based upon a 
multivariate analysis of how the likelihood of purchasing coverage increases as the cost of 
insurance, is reduced.  
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These data show that, on average, each 1 percent reduction in the price of insurance is 
associated with a 0.34 percent increase in the percentage of people purchasing coverage.12 
However, as shown in Figures A-1 and A-2, these data indicate that the magnitude of the price 
response tends to decline at higher income and age levels. These price response factors are used 
as probabilities to select eligible people in the model to take coverage in response to the 
subsidies. 
Figure A-1: 
Percentage Increase in Coverage Resulting from a One Percent Reduction  
in Premiums by Income Levela/ 
 
a/ Indicates a price elasticity ranging between –0.55 to -0.09 by income. 
Source:  The Lewin Group estimates. 
                                                     
12  Students of economics will recognize this as a price “elasticity.” 
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Figure A-2: 
Increase in Coverage Resulting from a One Percent Reduction in Premiums by Agea/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a/ Indicates a price elasticity ranging between –0.46 and –0.30 by age.  
Source:  The Lewin Group estimates. 
Once changes in sources of coverage are modeled, HBSM simulates the amount of covered 
health spending for each affected individual based upon the health utilization and spending 
data reported for each individual selected to become covered. This includes simulating the 
increase in utilization among newly insured people. In general, we assume that utilization 
among newly insured people will increase to the level reported by insured people with similar 
characteristics. The benefit costs are estimated from these spending data based upon the 
covered services and cost-sharing provisions of a typical health plan, or the minimum benefits 
package that is specified under the legislation.13  
D. Employer Impacts 
The Bill provides a tax credit to small employers for up to half of premium contributions and 
establishes a governmental reinsurance program that reduces the cost of employer health 
insurance. Both plans also include provisions designed to reduce health care costs (e.g., 
malpractice reforms, etc.) that would influence employers, decisions about offering coverage.  
Modeling these effects requires a representative sample of employers with detailed information 
on the characteristics of each employer, together with information on the characteristics of each 
worker and dependent in the firm, including health spending information. Because no one 
database provides this combination of employer and employee data, we developed “synthetic 
firms” from the available data. We also developed a model of insurance markets that simulates 
                                                     
13  For illustrative purposes we use the Blue Cross/Blue Shield “Basic” plan provided under the Federal Employees 
Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) to estimate benefit costs. 
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the process of rating health plans, based upon the insurance market rating laws in the 50 states 
and the District of Columbia.  
Our approach was to match each working individual in MEPS to one of the firms in the 2006 
Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Educational Trust (HRET) survey of 
2,000 employers, including insuring and non-insuring firms. We statistically matched these 
plans with a sample of employers in the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) to 
provide data on workers characteristics. Workers were assigned to firms that are consistent 
with the demographic and income characteristics of the employer’s workforce.14  We then 
“populated” each firm that an individual is matched to by randomly assigning additional MEPS 
workers to the firm who match the firm’s workforce characteristics. This provided complete 
employer units with all of the information required to simulate employer decisions. 
The employer tax credit was modeled assuming that it will be treated by employers as a 
reduction in the price of insurance. We estimated the number of non-insuring firms that 
respond by offering coverage based upon a Lewin multivariate analysis of how the percentage 
of employers offering coverage changes as the price of insurance changes. As shown in Figure 
A-3, for firms with 10 or fewer workers, a 1 percent reduction in premiums is associated with a 
0.87 percent increase in the number of employers offering coverage. It also shows that the price 
response for employers declines rapidly as firm size increases, and that there is very little price 
response in the largest firm size groups.  
                                                     
14  The Kaiser/HRET data provide information on the distribution of workers by wage level only. We statistically 
matched the Kaiser/HRET data with employers surveyed in the 1991 Health Insurance Association of America 
(HIAA) employer survey data, which provides detailed information on the characteristics of each employer’s 
workforce including number of workers by part-time/full-time status, age, gender, medical policy type and the 
coverage/eligibility status of employees. 
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Figure A-3: 
Percent Increase in Firms Offering Coverage With a One Percent Reduction in Premiums 
 
Source:  The Lewin Group estimates. 
We also used these data to estimate the impact of the various elements of Bill that would reduce 
employer health insurance premiums including the employer tax credit and the reduced 
premiums under the public plan. These features would generally reduce the cost of employer 
insurance. We simulated the impact of these changes in premiums on the number of employers 
offering insurance based upon the price response assumptions shown in Figure A-3.  
The model reflects variations in firm price elasticity depending upon the characteristics of the 
firm. For example, the model shows that the firm price elasticity tends to decline as age and 
income rise, as shown in Figures A-4 and A-5. This results in a lower estimated price elasticity 
among currently insuring firms -- averaging about -0.56 for firms with 10 or fewer workers -- 
because the employers that offer coverage tend to have older and more highly compensated 
workers.  
In addition, we estimated multivariate models predicting the percentage of the premium paid 
by the worker using the RWJF employer data. These equations measure how premium shares 
vary with the characteristics of the firm, their workforce and the amount of the total premium. 
These amounts are used to estimate the cost of insurance for workers in each firm selected to 
offer coverage in response to the program.  
Once firms are selected to offer coverage, we simulate enrollment among workers assigned to 
these plans. The enrollment decision is simulated with a multivariate model of the likelihood 
that eligible workers will take the coverage offered to them based upon data reported in the 
1996 MEPS data for people offered coverage through an employer. The model measures how 
take-up varies with the characteristics of the individual as well as the employee premium 
contribution required by the employer. 
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Figure A-4 
Employer Health Insurance Price Elasticity Estimates for Firms with Under 10 Workers by Average 
Wages and Salaries per Worker a/ 
a/ Based upon multivariate analysis of the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) Survey of 
Employer Characteristics. “Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM),” The Lewin Group, August 2003. 
Source: Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
Figure A-5 
Employer Health Insurance Price Elasticity Estimates for Firms with Under 10 Workers  
by Age of Workers a/ 
 
a/ Based upon multivariate analysis of the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) Survey of 
Employer  Characteristics. “Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM),” The Lewin Group, August 2003. 
Source: Lewin Group estimates using the Health Benefits Simulation Model (HBSM). 
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Finally, based upon a review of the economic literature, we assume that changes in employer 
costs resulting from these proposals would be passed on to workers in the form of changes in 
wage growth over time. For example, policies that reduce employer costs would result in a 
corresponding increase in wages for affected workers. Similarly, increases in employer health 
benefits costs are assumed to be passed on to workers as wage increases.15  HBSM also 
simulates the impact of these changes in wages upon federal and state tax revenues. 
E. Simulating Effects for Individuals and Self-employed 
We simulate the individual’s decision to enroll in the public plan by estimating the premium 
that these individuals would pay in the current private market for the benefits offered in the 
public pool. The public plan could increase coverage if it provides coverage to uninsured 
people at a lower cost than in the current market. This can also result in shifts in coverage from 
existing sources to the public plan.  
1. Simulating Changes in Number with Coverage 
We begin by estimating the program’s effect on the number of people with coverage. We first 
identify uninsured people who would now be able to purchase coverage at a lower price than 
they would pay in the individual market under current law. We interpret this as a reduction in 
premiums that will cause some people to take coverage. We simulate their decision to take that 
coverage using research on how changes in premiums affect the likelihood of taking coverage. 
We assume that newly insured people will enroll in whichever coverage option is least costly. 
In the next step, we identify currently insured people who would now face a higher premium. 
This would occur in cases where the availability of the public plan is coupled with changes in 
insurer rating regulations affecting the premiums in both the private market and the public 
plan. For example, the Obama proposal would prohibit medical underwriting, which will 
generally increase premiums for relatively healthy individuals now covered in the individual 
market. We also simulate losses of coverage for these people using the same research on how 
price affects the individual’s decision to take coverage.  
2. Allocation to Public and Private Coverage 
In this step, we identify privately insured people who would be eligible to purchase coverage at 
a lower cost through the public plan. We then simulate their decision to shift to the public plan 
based upon studies of how people respond to changes in the relative price of insurance within 
employer groups offering a choice of health plans. 16 We simulate these shifts in a two step 
process that allocates affected people into one of the following three groups: 
 People who remain with their current private health plan rather than shifting to the 
public plan;  
                                                     
15  Marginal tax rates are imputed to the MEPS household data based upon the tax rate data collected in the CPS 
data.  
16  Strombom, B., Buchmueller, T., Feldstein, P. “Switching Costs, Price Sensitivity and Health Plan Choice,” Journal 
of Health Economics, 21 (2002), 89-116. 
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 People who drop private coverage to enroll in the public plan due to the lower 
premiums; and 
 People who leave the public plan to enroll in a lower cost HMO.  
In the first step, we model the shift of privately insured individuals to the lower cost public 
plan. We do this using “plan change price elasticity” estimates developed by Strombom et al., 
which averages about -2.47. This means that on average, a 1.0 percent decrease in the price of an 
alternative source of coverage is associated with a 2.47 percent migration of enrollees to the 
lower cost health plan. As shown in Figure A-6, the likelihood of shifting to a lower cost plan is 
lowest for older and sicker people, reflecting that these groups are typically less willing to 
change providers. Individuals were randomly selected to shift to an HMO based upon these 
price changes and these price elasticity estimates.17 
Figure A-6 
Health Plan Change Price Elasticity Assumptions by Age and Health Risk 
All Insured Groups HMOs Only 
 Low Risk High Risk a/ Low Risk High Risk a/ 
Under 31 -5.8 -5.3 -7.0 -8.0 
31 – 45 -3.9 -3.6 -5.9 -6.4 
Over 45 -2.4 -2.1 -4.3 -4.5 
a/ The study defines high risk people as those who have selected illness or hospitalizations. In our 
model, as a proxy for this definition, we assumed that people with expected spending in excess of the 
80th percentile of spending are “high risk”. 
Source: Strombom, B., Buchmueller, T.,Feldstein, P. “Switching Costs, Price Sensitivity and Health Plan 
Choice,” Journal of Health Economics 21 (2002) 89-116.  
These estimates are consistent with other studies showing that people leaving fee-for-service 
(FFS) health plans for HMOs and other managed care plans tend to have lower costs than those 
who remain with these FFS plans. Similarly, people who leave HMOs for a FFS plan tend to 
have higher costs than those who remain with the HMO.18  
In the second step we model risk selection against the public plan. Some managed care plans 
would develop products that tend to attract younger and healthier people through benefits 
design or marketing practice. This will tend to leave the public plan with higher cost 
individuals. We simulate this by assuming that private HMOs are able to offer a product that is 
four percent less costly than the premium for the public plan. This assumption is based upon 
research showing that utilization of health services in HMOs is about four percent less than in 
PPO and other FFS plans.  
                                                     
17 Newly insured people were randomly assigned to HMOs based upon the percentage of privately insured people 
who are in HMOs after we have executed our simulation for currently insured people. 
18  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser, “Adverse Selection in Health Insurance,” National Bureau of 
Economic Research, working paper 6107, July 1997; and Paolo Belli, “How Adverse Selection Affects the Health 
Insurance Market,” Harvard School of Public Health.  
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We simulate the shift of individuals from the public plan to these HMOs using the plan change 
price elasticity estimates presented above in Figure A-6. This approach tends to leave higher 
cost individuals in the public plan, with lower cost individuals shifting to HMOs.  
F. Simulating Effects for Employers 
Under the public plan scenarios presented above, some or all employers would have the option 
of covering their workers under the public plan by paying a premium. In some cases, non-
insuring employers would start to offer coverage in response to the lower premium available in 
the public plan. Also, many currently insuring employers will shift to the public plan to take 
advantage of the lower public plan premium. The approach we use to simulate the impact of 
the public plan on employer coverage is similar to that used to simulate coverage decisions in 
the individual market.  
1. Simulate Changes in the Number of Employers Offering Coverage 
We first identify non-insuring employers who would now be able to purchase coverage at a 
lower price than they would pay in the current insurance market. We simulate their decision to 
take that coverage due to the price reduction using studies of how changes in premiums affect 
the likelihood that a firm will offer coverage. We assume that newly insured people will enroll 
in whichever coverage option is least costly. 
In the next step, we identify firms that would now face a higher premium. Under the Obama-
like health reform proposal modeled here, the elimination of medical underwriting would 
increase premiums for younger and healthier groups while reducing premiums for older and 
sicker groups. We simulate losses of coverage for these people using the studies of the effect of 
changes in premiums on the firm decision to offer insurance.  
2. Re-allocation to Public Plan 
In this stage, we identify privately insured firms that would be eligible to purchase coverage at 
a lower cost through the public plan. We simulate these shifts in a two step process that 
allocates affected people into one of the following three groups: 
 Employers that remain with their current private health plan rather than shifting to the 
public plan. (These will tend to include employers with older and less healthy workers 
who decide not to change their source of coverage, perhaps to retain their current 
physician); 
 Employers that drop private coverage to enroll in the public plan due to the lower 
premium; and 
 Employers that leave the public plan to enroll in a lower cost HMO.  
In the first step, we simulate the employer decision to switch to the lower cost public plan based 
upon the plan change price elasticity estimates used in our individual market simulations (see 
Figure A-6 above). We do this by estimating the plan change price elasticity for each worker in 
the firm based upon the age and health status of each worker. We then use this average price 
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change elasticity for workers in each firm to simulate the employer decision to change their 
source of coverage. 
In the second step we model risk selection against the public plan. We assume that managed 
care plans would develop products that tend to attract younger and healthier people through 
benefits design or marketing practice. This will tend to leave the public plan with higher cost 
individuals. We simulate this by assuming that private HMOs are able to offer a product that is 
four percent less costly than the premium for the public plan. This assumption is based upon 
research showing that utilization of health services in HMOs is about four percent less than in 
PPO and other FFS plans. We simulate the shift of individuals from the public plan to these 
HMOs using the plan change price elasticity estimates presented above.  
This approach tends to leave higher cost individuals in the public plan, with lower cost 
individuals shifting to HMOs. This accumulation of a disproportionate share of higher cost 
individuals in a given plan is called “adverse selection.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
